Title 55 Chapter 10: Juvenile Courts - 1974 by Annotated, Utah Code
SJ Quinney College of Law, University of Utah 
Utah Law Digital Commons 
Utah Code Annotated 1943-1995 
1974 
Title 55 Chapter 10: Juvenile Courts - 1974 
Utah Code Annotated 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.utah.edu/uca 
The Utah Code Annotated digital collection, hosted by Digital Commons, is brought to you for 
free and open access by the James E. Faust Law Library at the S.J. Quinney College of Law. 
Funds for this project have been provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
through the Library Services and Technology Act and are administered by the Utah State Library 
Division. For more information, please contact valeri.craigle@law.utah.edu. 
Recommended Citation 
Utah Code Annotated Title 55-10 (Michie, 1974) 
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by Utah Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Utah Code Annotated 1943-1995 by an authorized administrator of Utah Law Digital Commons. For 
more information, please contact valeri.craigle@law.utah.edu. 
DAY NURSERIES 55-9-5 
55-9-2. Visitation and inspection.-The rules and regulations prescribed 
by the board of family services shall incorporate or provide for standards, 
developed by the division of family services in co-operation with the 
division of health and the department of education, assuring the health, 
safety, welfare and education of the children, and shall provide for such 
visits or inspections by appropriate authorities as may be necessary to ob-
tain compliance with the standards prescribed. Failure to comply with such 
standards shall be cause for revocation of the license. 
History: L. 1943, ch. 16, § 2; C. 1943, 
Supp,, 14-8a-2; L. 1969, ch, 197, § 87, 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1969 amendment substituted "board 
of family services" for "welfare depart-
ment," "division of family services" for 
"such department" and "the department of 
education" for "state departments of 
health and education." 
55-9-3. Application for and contents of license.-The application for a 
license shall be in a form prescribed by the division of family services. 
The license shall state to whom it is issued, the particular premises where 
the children are to be cared for, the number of children that may be cared 
for at any one time, and the period during which the license will be in force 
and effect. 
History: L. 1943, ch. 16, § 3; C. 1943, 
Supp,, 14-8a-3; L. 1969, ch, 197, § 88. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1969 amendment substituted "divi-
sion of family services" for "public wel-
fare commission." 
55-9-4. Revocation.-Licenses may be revoked for cause by or under 
the authority of the division of family services, in accordance with rules 
and regulations prescribed by the board of family services. 
History: L. 1943, ch. 16, § 4; C. 1943, 
Supp., 14-8a-4; L. 1969, ch. 197, § 89, 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1969 amendment substituted "divi-
sion of family services" for "public wel-
fare commission" and "the board of family 
services" for "said commission." 
55-9-5. Crimes and pend.lties.-Any day nursery, person, association, 
corporation, institution, or agency violating the provisions of this act, shall 
be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
History: L. 1943, ch. 16, § 5; C. 1943, Effective Date. 
Supp., 14-8a-6. Section 6 of Laws 1943, ch. 16 provided 
that the act should take effect on ap-
proval. Approved March 17, 1943. 
CHAPTER 10 
JUVENILE COURTS 
Section 55-10-1 to 55-10-48. Repealed. 
55-10-49. Special places of detention to be provided. 
55-10-49.1. County commissioners to provide detention facilities-Advisory 
board. 






































Assistance of department of public welfare in establishment and 
administration of detention centers. 
State financial assistance for detention centers-Conditions for ap-
proval by department of public welfare. 
State assistance for providing housing and other physical facilities 
for detention centers. 
Appropriation. 
55-10-62. Repealed. 
Purpose of act-Construction. 
Definitions. 
Establishment of juvenile court-Organization and status of court-
Salaries and expenses of judges. 
Juvenile court districts. 
Judges of juvenile court-Number-Practice of law prohibited-
Full-time service. 
Sessions of juvenile court-Assignment of judges to other districts. 
Juvenile court commission-Members-Organization-Expenses of 
members and secretary. 
Judges of juvenile court-Appointments-Terms-Vae.ancies-Tem-
porary judges and emergency appointees. 
Judges of juvenile court-Mandatory retirement. 
Board of juvenile court judges-Members-Organization-Powers 
and duties. 
Administrator of the juvenile court-Appointment-Qualifications 
-Powers and duties. 
Director of probation and clerk of court-Appointment-Duties-
Probation officers-Deputy clerks. 
Employees of jnvenile court and board of juvenile court judges-
Salaries-Merit system for employment-Discharge or suspension. 
Referees-Appointment-Qualifications-Duties. 
Juvenile court advisory committee - Appointment - Members -
Terms-Duties-State juvenile court advisory committee. 
Jurisdiction of juvenile court-Judge may sit as district court 
judge. 
Jurisdiction of district court-Determination of custody questions 
by juvenile court-District court judge may sit as juvenile 
court judge. 
Criminal proceedings involving children-Transfer to juvenile court. 
Offenses against children by adults-Jurisdiction of juvenile court 
-Penalties. 
Offenses against children by adults-Practice and procedure in 
juvenile court. 
Felony against or involving child-County or city attorney to 
notify juvenile court. 
Petition to commence children's cases-Preliminary inquiry-Non-
judicial adjustments-Violations of motor vehicle laws, fish and 
game laws and boating laws. 
Title of petition and other court documents-Form and contents of 
petition-Order for temporary custody-Physical or psychological 
examination of child, parent or guardian-Dismissal of petition. 
Venue of children's cases - Transfer or certification to other 
districts. 
Felony committed by child-Hearing and certification to district 
court. 
Summons-Issuance and contents-Emergency medical or surgical 
treatment-Compulsory process for attendance of witnesses, when 
authorized-Expenses of witnesses. 
Service of summons and process-Notice to absent parent or 
guardian. 
Failure to obey summons-Contempt-Warrant of arrest, when 
anthorized-Appointment of guardian ad !item. 
Child taken into custody by peace officer, private citizen or proba-




































Placement of child in detention or shelter facility-Grounds-De-
tention hearings-Period of detention-Confinement of children 
held for criminal proceedings-Bail laws inapplicable, exception. 
Child confined in jail or other adult facility-Official to notify 
juvenile court. 
Failure of parent or custodian to appear and bring child to court-
Warrant issued-Penalty. 
Hearings-Conduct of-Public excluded, exceptions. 
Children's cases heard separately from adult cases-Child or parents 
or custodian heard separately-Continuance of hearing. 
Hearings-Record of proceedings-Right of parties to counsel-
County attorney to represent state-Special rules for violations 
of motor vehicle laws, fish and game laws and boating laws-
Admissibility of special reports on child. 
Consolidation of proceedings involving more than one child. 
Amendment of petition - When authorized - Continuance of pro-
ceedings. 
Social study and report required in children's cases-Exceptions. 
Adjudication of jurisdiction of juvenile court---Disposition of cases 
-Enumeration of possible court orders-Considerations of court. 
Continuing jurisdiction of juvenile court-Period of and termina-
tion of jurisdiction-Notice of discharge from state hospital or 
training school. 
Transfer of continuing jurisdiction to other district. 
Period of operation of judgment, decree or order-Rights and 
responsibilities of agency or individual granted legal custody. 
Exchange of information with agency or institution having legal 
custody-Transfer of child to state prison or other adult facility 
prohibited. 
Children's cases deemed civil proceedings-Adjudication of juris-
diction by juvenile court not conviction of crime, exception-
Record and evidence inadmissible in other proceedings, excep-
tion-Child not to be charged with crime, exception-Traffic 
violation cases, abstracts to department of public safety. 
Modification of order or decree-Requirements for changing or 
terminating custody, probation or protective supervision. 
New hearings authodzed-Grounds and procedure. 
Modification or termination of custody order or decree-Grounds-
Procedure. 
Termination of parental rights---Grounds-Hearing-Effect of order 
-Placement of child-Voluntary petition of parent. 
Support and expenses of child in custody of individual or institu-
tion-Order for payment by parent or other person authorized-
Payment by division of family services. 
Search warrants authorized in cases of detention or ill-treatment of 
children. 
Appeal to Supreme Court from order, decree or judgment of juvenile 
court-Procedure. 
Violation of order of court-Contempt-Penalty. 
Courtrooms, office space and equipment-Maintenance costs of 
juvenile court. 
Fines, penalties and forfeitures paid to county treasurer-Fees-
Sheriff to maintain order and provide transportation. 
Court records - Inspection - Fingerprinting child prohibited, 
exception. 
Expungement of juvenile court record-Petition-Procedure. 
Destruction of juvenile court records, when allowed. 
Co-operation of political subdivisions and public or private agencies 
and organizations. 
Plan for obtaining health and related services for juveniles-Duty 
of administrator. 
Existing courtrooms, offices, facilities and equipment transferred to 
and existing contracts or agreements assumed by juvenile court. 




55-10-J PUBLIC WELFARE 
55-10-1 to 55-10-3.1, 55-10-4 to 55-10-48. 
Repeal. 
Sections 55-10-1 to 55-10-3.1, 55-10-4 to 
55-10-48 (L. 1903, ch. 124, § 6; C. L_ 1907, 
§ 720X27; C. L. 1917, § 1838; L. 1931, ch. 
29, §§ 2 to 46; R. S. 1933, 14-7-2 to 14-7-47; 
L. 1939, ch. 23, § 1; 1941, ch. 67, §§ 1 to 
4; R. S. 1943, 14-7-1.10, 14-7-1.ll, 14-7-2 
Repealed, 
to 14-7-47; L. 1947, ch. 16, § l; 1957, ch. 
113, §§ 1, 2), relating to juvenile courts, 
probation commission and probation offi-
cers, were repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 165, 
§ 61. For present provisions, see 55-10-63 
et seq. 
55-10-49. SpeciaJ places of detention to be provided.-Children under 
the age of sixteen years, who are apprehended by any officer or are brought 
before any court for examination under any of the provisions of this chap-
ter, shall not be confined in the jails, lockups or police cells used for 
ordinary criminals or persons charged with crime. It shall be the duty of 
counties, with the assistance of the state department of public welfare, to 
make provision for the custody and detention of such children and other 
children under the age of eighteen years who shall be in need of detention 
care prior to their trial or examination or while awaiting assignment to a 
home or facility in such places as shall meet minimum standards of deten-
tion care to be established by the state department of public welfare either 
by arrangement with some person or society willing to undertake the re-
sponsibility of such temporary custody or detention on such terms as may 
be agreed upon, or by providing suitable premises entirely distinct and 
separate from the ordinary jails, lockups or police cells. 
History: L. 1931, ch. 29, § 47; R. S, 
1933 & C. 1943, 14-7-48; L. 1961, ch, 127, 
§ 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1961 amendment rewrote the sec-
ond sentence to add the provisions relat-
ing to the duties of the state department 
of public welfare. 
Collateral References. 
Infants@::::>16.12. 
43 C.J.S. Infants § 93. 
55-10-49.1. County commissioners to provide detention facilities-Ad-
visory board.-County commissioners of each county shall provide or ar-
range for detention facilities and services in accordance with the provisions 
of this act. They may choose three or more citizens with broad child-
welfare interests to serve as an advisory board on detention. 
History: C. 1953, 55-10-49.1, enacted by 
L. 1961, ch. 127, § 2. 
Title of Act. 
An act amending section 55-10-49, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, making it the duty 
of counties to make provision for the de-
tention of children; and enacting new 
sections to be known as sections 55-10-
49.1, 55-10-49.2, 55-10-49.3, 55-10-49.4, 55-
10-49.5, and 55-10-49.6, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, providing for state assistance 
to counties conforming with approved de-
tention standards; defining the powers of 
the state welfare department; and making 
appropriations for state assistance. 
55-10-49.2. Contracts between counties for detention services-Payment 
for services.-A county choosing not to maintain detention facilities of its 
own may contract with another county to render the required detention 
service. The county so contracting shall pay for each day or fraction there-
of that each child from any such county may be retained in detention from 
the general fund of the county an amount up to fifty per cent of the average 
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per capita daily cost of the detention facility operation as shown by the cost 
records approved and audited by the department of public welfare for the 
fiscal period. Where counties contract with each other, the department of 
public welfare will supplement the payment in a like amount. 
History: C. 1953, 55-10-49.2, enacted by 
L. 1961, ch. 127, § 2. 
55-10-49.3. Assistance of department of public welfare in establishment 
and administration of detention centers.-The state department of public 
welfare is empowered and directed to give guidance and direction to coun-
ties in the establishment and administration of detention centers where 
counties qualify or desire to qualify hereunder for state financial assistance. 
The state department of public welfare is further empowered and di-
rected to initiate, encourage and assist the formation of detention centers 
in areas including Salt Lake and Weber counties and in other counties of 
this state where adequate detention facilities do not exist on the effective 
date of this act, or where the counties do not themselves undertake to 
provide adequate detention facilities as contemplated by this act. 
But nothing herein shall relieve such counties from the responsibilities 
as set forth in section 55-10-49. 
History: C. 1953, 55-10-49.3, enacted by 
L. 1961, ch. 127, § 2. 
55-10-49.4. State financial assistance for detention centers-Conditions 
for approval by department of public welfare.-State financial assistance up 
to fifty per cent of the total net expenditure for capital improvements and 
operation and maintenance of detention facilities by the counties shall be 
paid by the state, conditioned upon: 
(a) approval by the state department of public welfare of the county 
areas to be served by the detention center. 
(b) approval by the state department of public welfare of a specific 
work program to be performed by the detention center for the fiscal year. 
( c) approval by the state department of public welfare of facilities 
and programs providing for adequate security. 
Such approval to be determined by reasonable rules to be established 
by the commissioners of the state department of public welfare, which 
reasonable rules may vary between detention centers according to local 
conditions, and which shall first receive the approval and consent of the 
governor. 
If a county provides, or has provided by purchase or construction, or 
otherwise the physical plant required for detention, an equitable figure in 
lieu of rental may be agreed to by the public welfare department and this 
may be used in determining the county's costs in which the state shall 
share. 
History: C. 1953, 55-10-49.4, enacted by 
L. 1961, ch. 127, § 2. 
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55-10-49.5. State assistance for providing housing and other physical 
facilities for detention centers.-The state department of public welfare 
may, with the aid of the state building board, assist counties in developing 
plans intended to provide suitable housing and other physical facilities 
to meet the detention requirements of any county or group of counties. 
Nothing in this act shall preclude the state department of public welfare 
from contracting with a county or group of counties for the use of existing 
state-owned properties for detention purposes on a fair and reasonable cost 
basis. 
History: C. 1953, 55-10-49.5, enacted by 
L. 1961, ch. 127, § 2. 
55-10-49.6. Appropriation.-There is hereby appropriated from the 
state general fund not otherwise appropriated, the sum of two hundred and 
fifty thousand dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary, to the 
department of public welfare to finance the cost of this program for the 
period ending June 30, 1963. 
History: C. 1953, 55-10-49.6, enacted by 
L. 1961, ch. 127, § 2. 
55-10-50 to 55-10-62. Repealed. 
Repeal. 
Sections 55-10-50 to 55-10-62 (L. 1931, 
ch. 29, §§48 to 62; R. S. 1933, 14-7-49 to 
14-7-61; L. 1939, ch. 24, § l; C. 1943, 14-7-
49 to 14-7-61), relating to juvenile courts, 
were repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 165, § 61. 
For present provisions, see 55-10-63 et seq. 
55-10-63. Purpose of act-Construction.-It is the purpose of this act to 
secure for each child coming before the juvenile court such care, guidance, 
and control, preferably in his own home, as will serve his welfare and the 
best interes,ts of the state; to preserve and strengthen family ties whenever 
possible; to secure for any child who is removed from his home the care, 
guidance, and discipline required to assist him to develop into a responsible 
citizen, to improve the conditions and home environment responsible for his 
delinquency; and, at the same time, to protect the community and its indi-
vidual citizens against juvenile violence and juvenile law breaking. To this 
end this act shall be liberally construed. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 1. 
Title of Act. 
An act relating to juvenile courts; pro-
viding for the establishment of a juvenile 
court for the state ancl for juvenile court 
districts; establishing a juvenile court 
commission; providing for the selection of 
judges: prescribing the jurisdiction, pow-
ers, and procedure of the juvenile court in 
children's cases and certain adult cases 
and to require parental participation in 
rehabilitation efforts of children com-
mitted to the State Industrial School; 
providing for the transfer of certain cases 
of serious delinquencies for criminal pro-
ceedings; pei-mitting publicity in serious 
cases; providing for a board of juvenile 
court judges and for the appointment., ten-
ure, and duties of probation officers and 
other employees; providing for citizens' 
advisory committees to the juvenile court; 
specifying duties of peace officers with re-
spect to the detention of children; pro-
viding for the co-operation of local and 
state public agencies; providing for the 
transfer of facilities to the juvenile court; 
providing for legislative appropriations; 
and repealing sections 55-10-1 and 55-10-2, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, and sections 
55-10-3 and 55-10-3.1, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amendecl and added by chapter 
113, Laws of Utah 1957, and repealing 
sections 55-10-4 to and including section 
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55-10-48, and sections 55-10-50 to and in-
cluding section 55-10-62,, Utah Code .An-
notated 1953. 
Purpose. 
The purpose of this act was to confer 
on the juvenile court jurisdiction con-
current with that of the district courts 
to act in the interest of children in the 
variou& kinds of troubled circumstances 
set forth in 55-10-77 . .Anderson v . .Ander-
son, 18 U. (2d) 89, 416 P. 2d 308. 
Collateral References. 
Infants·e:>18. 
43 C . .J.S. Infants § 6. 
Statutes generally, 47 .A.m . .Jur. 2d 989, 
.Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and De-
pendent Children § 8. 
Law Review. 
The Utah .Juvenile Court .A.ct of 1965, 
Glenn R. Winters, 9 Utah L. Rev. 509. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER L.A. W 
Constitutionality. 
.Although provision of 55-10-1 purporting 
to delegate control and supervision over 
"the juvenile courts" to the public welfare 
commission violated .A.rt. V, § 1, Utah 
Constitution, there was no constitutional 
objection to the balance of the language 
which was separable. In re Woodward, 14 
U. (2d) 336, 384 P. 2d 110. 
Parents' preferred right to custody of 
child. 
Juvenile court could not deprive a par-
ent of custody of a minor child and com-
mit him to state industrial school unless it 
appeared that such parent was unfit to 
have custody of the child. Parents should 
not be deprived of child's custody until 
first given a reasonable opportunity, with 
such assistance as might be rendered by 
officers of juvenile court, to bring about 
the desired reformation. In re State in 
Interest of Bennett, 77 U. 247, 293 P. 963. 
Although rights of parents were to be 
respected as to care, custody, and control 
of their minor children, still where it ap-
peared that parents were unable to care 
for them properly, welfare of children was 
the paramount consideration, so that in 
action by mother for custody of children 
previously awarded to aunt, aunt was en-
titled to custody in absence of any evi-
dence of change of condition of parents. 
Ex parte Flora, 84 U. 143, 29 P. 2d 498. 
Former statute required that no child be 
taken from its parent, without the parent's 
consent, unless the court found from the 
evidence either that the parent had know-
ingly failed to provide the child with the 
proper maintenance and care contemplated 
and required by both law and morals, or 
unless the court should find from all the 
circumstances in the case that the wel-
fare of the child required that its custody 
be taken from the parent. It was clear 
that the mother in leaving the child as 
she did knowingly failed and neglected 
to provide her baby with the proper main-
tenance and care contemplated and re-
quired by both law and morals. But this 
alone did not require the court to deprive 
her of its custody. Statute merely forbade 
the court to deprive the parent of the 
custody of its child unless the necessary 
finding was made, but did not require 
the court to deprive the parent of the 
custody in all cases where such finding 
was made. In re Bradley, 109 U. 538, 167 
P. 2d 978. 
Presumption that it was for best inter-
ests of child, for parent to have custody 
was rebuttable and yielded to evidence 
that interests of child required it to be in 
custody of third person. In re Bradley, 
109 U. 538, 167 P. 2d 978; In re Olson, 111 
U. 365, 180 P. 2d 210. 
While former section dealing with par-
ents' preferred right was not binding in 
a case tried in the district court, it did 
establish the policy of the law in the 
juvenile courts to be in harmony with 
holdings of the court in earlier cases. 
Walton v. Coffman, 110 U. 1, 169 P. 2d 
97. 
Former section recognized parents' pref-
erential right to custody of child until 
adjudicated otherwise; .Juvenile Code gave 
repeated warnings of that right and emer-
gency provisions, such as statutes dealing 
with arrest of juvenile without a warrant 
and searches and seizures, were not in-
tended as a convenient vessel for nullify-
ing that preference. In re State in Inte-r-
est of .Johnson, 110 U. 500, 175 P. 2d 486. 
Custody of twelve-year-old girl who 
had been living with maternal grand-
parents for eight years following death of 
mother, and whose father had neglected 
to support or provide for her welfare, was 
properly awarded to maternal aunt a.nd 
uncle by marriage who came to live at 
home of girl's grandparents following 
death of her grandmother, subject to su-
pervision by county welfare department, 
rather than to father, pursuant to girl's 
choice, even though county welfare de-
partment had been extending financial as-
sistance, where evidence established that 
aunt and uncle were financially able to 
provide proper care and training for girl. 
In re Olson, 111 U. 365, 180 P. 2d 210. 
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Former statute did not mandate the 
court to leave the custody of a neglected 
child with the parents when the court 
found from the evidence introduced that 
the parents had knowingly failed and 
neglected to provide the proper mainte-
nance, education and training required by 
law and morals. Hence it was proper for 
the juvenile court to deprive the parents 
of the custody of their neglected child 
where the parents contributed to or caused 
their children to become neglected inas-
much as they taught, preached, and prac-
ticed the law of plural marriage and by 
their conduct and example have encour-
aged the children to become polygamists. 
In re State in Interest of Black, 3 U. 
(2d) 315, 283 P. 2d 887, cert. den. 350 
U. S. 923, 76 S. Ct. 211, distinguished in 
7 U. (2d) 413, 326 P. 2d 707. 
Status of court. 
The juvenile court is a court of law and 
an integral part of the judicial branch of 
government as is the Supreme, district, 
and inferior courts sanctioned by the 
legislature, and the justice courts. In re 
Woodward, 14 U. (2d) 336, 384 P. 2d 110. 
Validity of juvenile court judgment. 
Conclusion of Supreme Court that the 
provision of 55-10-1 delegating control and 
supervision over "the juvenile courts" to 
the public welfare commission offended 
Art. V, § 1, Utah Constitution, did not 
affect validity of juvenile court judgment 
committing a minor to the industrial 
school conditionally where the judgment 
was supported by sufficient evidence. In 
re Woodward, 14. U. (2d) 336, 384 P. 2d 
110. 
55-10-64. Definitions.-As used in this act: 
(1) "Court" means the juvenile court or the district juvenile court, as 
the case may be. 
(2) "Board" means the board of juvenile court judges. 
(3) "Child" means a person less than eighteen years of age. 
(4) "Adult" means a person eighteen years of age or over, except that 
persons eighteen years or over under the continuing jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court pursuant to section 55-10-101 shall be referred to as children. 
(5) "Detention" means the temporary care of children who require se-
cure custody, in physically restricting facilities pending court disposition or 
transfer to another jurisdiction. 
(6) "Shelter" means the temporary care of children in physically 
unrestricting facilities pending court disposition or transfer to another 
jurisdiction. 
(7) "Legal custody" means a relationship embodying the following 
rights and duties: the right to physical custody of a child; the right and 
duty to protect, train and discipline him; the duty to provide him with 
food, clothing, shelter, education, and ordinary medical care; the right to 
determine where and with whom he shall live, and the right, in an emer-
gency, to authorize surgery or other extraordinary care. 
(8) "Commit" means to transfer legal custody. 
(9) "Guardianship of the person" includes, among other things, the 
authority to consent to marriage, to enlistment in the armed forces, and to 
consent to major medical, surgical, or psychiatric treatment. "Guardian-
ship of the person" includes legal custody, if legal custody is not vested in 
another person, agency, or institution. 
(10) "Residual parental rights and duties" means those rights and 
duties remaining with the parent after legal custody or guardianship, or 
both, have been vested in another person or agency, including, but not lim-
ited to, the responsibility for support, the right to consent to adoption, the 
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right to determine the child's religious affiliation, and the right to reason-
able visitation unless restricted by the court. If no guardian has been ap-
pointed, "residual parental rights and duties" also include the right to con-
sent to marriage, to enlistment, and to consent to major medical, surgical, 
or psychiatric treatment. 
(11) "Adjudication" means a finding by the court, incorporated in a 
decree, that the facts alleged in the petition have been proved. 
(12) "Child placement agency" means a private agency licensed to 
receive children for placement or adoption under Title 55, chapter 8, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953; or a private agency receiving children for placement 
or adoption in another state which agency is licensed or approved where 
such license or approval is required by law. 
(13) "Deprivation of custody" means transfer of legal custody by the 
court from a parent or the parents or a previous legal custodian to another 
person, agency, or institution. 
(14) "Termination of parental rights" means the permanent elimination 
of all parental rights and duties, including residual parental rights and 
duties, by court order. 
(15) "Probation" means a legal status created by court order following 
an adjudication on the ground of a violation of law or under section 55-10-
77 (2) (b) or (c), whereby the child is permitted to remain in his home 
under prescribed conditions and under supervision by the probation 
department or other agency designated by the court, subject to return to 
the court for violation of any of the conditions prescribed. 
(16) "Protective supervision" means a legal status created by court 
order following an adjudication on the ground of neglect or dependency, 
whereby the child is permitted to remain in his home, and supervision and 
assistance to correct the neglect or dependency is provided by the proba-
tion department or other agency designated by the court. 
( 17) "Neglected child" includes: 
A child whose parent, guardian, or custodian has abandoned him or has 
subjected him to mistreatment or abuse; 
A child who lacks proper parental care by reason of the fault or habits 
of the parent, guardian, or custodian; 
A child whose parent, guardian, or custodian fails or refuses to provide 
proper or necessary subsistence, education, or medical care, including 
surgery or psychiatric services when required, or any other care necessary 
for his health, morals or well-being. 
(18) "Dependent child" includes a child who is homeless or without 
proper care through no fault of his parent, guardian, or custodian. 
(19) "Therapist" means a person employed by the state industrial 
school for the purpose of conducting psychological treatment and counseling 
of a child committed to the state industrial school, or any other person li-
censed or approved by the state for the purpose of conducting psycho-
logical treatment and counseling. 
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(20) "Group rehabilitation therapy" means psychological and social 
counseling of one or more persons in the group, depending upon the recom-
mendation of the therapist. 
(21) The singular includes the plural, the plural the singular, and the 
masculine the feminine, when consistent with the intent of this act. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 2. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Chapter 8 of this title, cited in subd. 
(12), was repealed by Laws 1971, ch. 133, 
§ 7. For present provisions, see 55-8a. 
Dependent child. 
Finding of dependency, premised solely 
on the inability of the father to furnish 
his children with personal guidance and 
care because of his incarceration, was in 
error where the father had arranged for 
the care of his children by relatives whose 
home provided a fine, stable, com.fortabl0 
environment. In re State in. Interest of 
Valdez, 29 U. (2d) 63, 504 P. 2d 1372. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Abandoned, neglected and dependent child. 
Whether a child was to be regarded as 
"abandoned," or "dependent" or "neg-
lected" within the meaning of former 
definitions section, depended upon the 
facts and circumstances of each case. In 
re Bradley, 109 U. 538, 167 P. 2d 978. 
Even though there was evidence in. the 
record that the mother contemplated turn-
ing her child over to a nursery in Cali-
fornia while she worked, this fact in and 
of itself was n.o evidence of any idea of 
abandoning the child. In re State in Inter-
est of Johnson, 110 U. 500, 175 P. 2d 486. 
Fact that former section specified that 
"dependent child" should include child 
who was homeless or destitute through no 
fault of parent did not mean that child 
who was not provided with proper home 
by reason of fault or neglect of parnnt was 
not a "dependent child." In re Olson, 
111 U. 365, 180 P. 2d 210. 
Petition alleging that, since death of 
child's mother, father had failed to care 
or provide for child and that maternal 
grandparents were caring for child, suffi-
ciently showed "neglect" on part of father 
to support child, but did not allege suf-
ficient facts to show "dependency." In re 
Olson, 111 U. 365, 180 P. 2d 210. 
Facts that maternal grandparents hon-
ored request of dying mother to look 
after child, assumed responsibility of pro-
viding care and training for child and did 
not request finan.cial assistance from 
father did not preclude finding that child 
was "neglected child" where father, al-
though not lacking in employment, made 
no offer to assist financially during eight-
year period before manifesting apparent 
interest to have child live in his home. In 
re Olson, 111 U. 365, 180 P. 2d 2,10. 
Children of parents living in polygamy 
who taught, preached and practiced the 
law o.f plural marriage and encouraged 
their children to teach, preach and pra~ 
tice that law were "neglected children.' 
In re State in Interest of Black, 3 U. 
(2d) 315, 283 P. 2d 887, cert. den. 350 
U. S. 923, 76 S. Ct. 211, distinguished in 
7 U. (2d) 413, 326 P. 2d 707. 
Custody in question or dispute. 
'l'he custody of the child was not "in 
question or dispute" in the sense con-
templated by former definitions section, 
so long as it appeared that the natural 
parent had the undisputed right to cus-
tody. When custody was conceded to be 
in the parent, but action was instituted 
to have that custody changed to another 
as a protection to the child, custody was 
not "in question or dispute" as contem-
plated by statute. On the other hand, if 
the child was not in the custody of a nat-
ural parent and the contestants for its cus-
tody were not obligated by law to assume 
responsibility for its care, it was a child 
whose custody was "in question or dis-
pute," requiring the state to consider the 
child as a dependent child as defined by 
statute. In re State in Interest of John-
son, 110 U. 500, 175 P. 2d 486. 
"Delinquent child" or "juvenile." 
Former definitions section was cited and 
relied upon for the proposition that a per-
son under eighteen years of age, who vio-
lated the law, was merely a "delinquent 
child" or a "juvenile," and had not com-
mitted a crime or public offense. Sanders 
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 104 U. 85, 
138 P. 2d 239. 
"Institution." 
Children's Home Society, a California 
corporation, was held to be an "institu-
tion" within definition in Comp. Laws 
1907. Stanford v. Gray, 42 U. 228, 129 
P. 423, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 989. 
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Review. 
Where sufficient material findings sup-
ported by evidence upheld judgment that 
child was "neglected" and that she should 
be placed in custody of her maternal aunt 
and uncle by marriage, Supreme Court 
could not disturb ,judgment on review, 
even though some findings were surplus-
age. In re Olson, 111 U. 365, 180 P. 2d 
210. 
55-10-65. Establishment of juvenile court-Organization and status of 
court-Salaries and expenses of judges.-There is established for the state 
of Utah a court to be known as the juvenile court. 
The juvenile court shall be a court of record, shall have a seal, and its 
judges, clerks, and referees shall have the power to administer oaths and 
affirmations. The juvenile court shall be of equal status with the district 
courts of the state, and shall be subject to the supervisory powers of the 
Supreme Court. The judges of the juvenile court shall receive the same 
salaries, and expense payments, that the judges of the district courts re-
ceive under present law and any amendments thereto. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 3. 
Collateral References. 
Infants~l8. 
43 C.J.S. Infants § 6. 
Juvenile courts, 47 Am. Jur. 2d 986 
et seq., Juvenile Courts and Delinquent 
and Dependent Children § 1 et seq. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Authority to establish courts. 
Juvenile courts were established in pur-
suance of the authority vested in the 
legislature by Const. Art. VIII, § 1. Salt 
Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 42, U. 
548, 134 P. 560. 
55-10-66. Juvenile court districts.-The state shall be divided into five 
juvenile court districts which shall be constituted as follows: 
District 1: The counties of Box Elder, Cache, Rich, Weber, Morgan, 
and Davis. 
District 2: The counties of Salt Lake and Tooele. 
District 3: The counties of Utah, vVasatch, Millard, Juab, Sanpete and 
Summit. 
District 4: The counties of Sevier, Piute, Wayne, Garfield, Beaver, 
Iron, Washington, and Kane. 
District 5: The counties of Carbon, Daggett, Duchesne, Uintah, Emery, 
Grand, and San Juan. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 4; 1971, ch. Compiler's Notes. 
131, § 1. The 1971 amendment moved Summit 
county from District 2 to District 3. 
55-10-67. Judges of juvenile court-Number-Practice of law pro-
hibited-Full-time service.-Until otherwise provided by law, there shall 
be one judge for each juvenile court district except that District 1 shall 
have two, and District 2 shall have three judges. 
No judge of a juvenile court shall practice law during the term of his 
office, and no judge shall have a partner who practices law. All juvenile 
court judges shall serve in full-time positions. 
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History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 5; 1971, ch. 
131, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1971 amendment substituted "ex-
cept that District 1 shall have two, and 
District 2 shall have three judges" for 
"except that district 2 shall have two 
judges." 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Constitutionality. 
Although the provision of forme,r 55-10-3 
that judge of juvenile court could be re-
moved by the public welfare commission 
"for cause" represented an effort to create 
an unconstitutional grant of power, in-
valid under Art. VIII, § 11, Utah Consti-
tution, there was no constitutional objec-
tion to the balance of the language which 
was separable. In re Woodward, 14 U. (2d) 
336, 384 P. 2d 110. 
Validity of juvenile court judgment. 
Conclusion of Supreme Court that the 
provision of former 55-10-3 for removal 
of judge of juvenile court by public wel-
fare commission "for cause" offended Art. 
VIII, § 11, Utah Constitution did not 
affect validity of juvenile court judgment 
committing a minor to the industrial 
school conditionally where the judgment 
was supported by sufficient evidence. In 
re Woodward, 14 U. (2d) 336, 384 P. 2d 
110. 
55-10-68. Sessions of juvenile court-Assignment of judges to other 
districts.-In each county regular juvenile court sessions shall be held at a 
place designated by the judge or judges of the juvenile court district with 
the approval of the board. 
Court sessions shall be held in each county at such time as the presiding 
judge of the juvenile court shall direct, except that a judge of the district 
may hold court in any county within the district at any time, if required 
by the urgency of the case. The presiding judge of the juvenile court shall 
assign a judge to another district for a temporary period when required 
in the interest of proper and efficient administration of juvenile justice 
in the state. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 6; 1971, ch. 
131, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1971 amendment substituted "shall" 
for "may" in the last sentence. 
55-10-69. Juvenile court commission - Members - Organization - Ex-
penses of members and secretary.-There is created a commission to be 
known as the juvenile court commission, which shall consist of the chief 
justice of the Supreme Court or a justice of that court designated by the 
chief justice, the director of the division of family services or a member of 
that division designated by the director, the president of the Utah state 
bar or a member of the state bar commission designated by the president, 
the state superintendent of public instruction, and the director of the 
division of health. The Supreme Court member of the juvenile court com-
mission shall serve as its chairman and the clerk of the Supreme Court shall 
act as the secretary of the commission and shall maintain its files and 
records. The members of the commission and the secretary shall be entitled 
to be paid by the state their actual and necessary expenses in attending 
meetings and performing the duties of their office. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 7; 1969, 
ch. 197, § 90. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1969 amendment substituted "the 
director of the division of family servicea 
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or a member of that division designated 
by the director" for "chairman of the pub-
lic welfare commission or a member of 
that commission designated by the chair-
man" and substituted "director of the divi-
sion of health" for "state director of 
public health." 
Section 66 of Laws 1965, eh. 165 pro-
vided: "This act shall take effeet on July 
1, 1965, except that sections 7 and 8 [55-
10-69 and 55-10-70] of this act shall take 
effect on May 15, 1965." 
55-10-70. Judges of juvenile court-Appointments-Terms-Vacancies 
-Temporary judges and emergency appointees.-(1) When a vacancy oc-
curs in the office of any judge of a juvenile court or upon the expiration of 
the term of any judge of a juvenile court, the governor shall appoint a judge 
from a list of at least two candidates nominated by the juvenile court com-
mission. Each candidate shall be a member of the Utah state bar in good 
standing, shall be chosen without regard to political affiliation, and on the 
basis of ability, judicial temperament, and special aptitude for juvenile 
court work, taking into consideration his interest, understanding, and expe-
rience with respect to problems of family and child welfare, and with 
respect to the control of juvenile delinquency. The concurrence of at least 
three members of the commission shall be required to make nominations 
under this section. 
(2) Judges shall be appointed for a term of six years and until their 
successors are appointed and have qualified. If vacancies occur before the 
expiration of the term of any judge, appointments to fill such vacancies 
shall be made for a six-year term. Juvenile court judges legally in office 
on the effective date of this act shall continue in office until the term for 
which they were appointed has expired and shall be eligible for reappoint-
ment as provided in subsection (1). However, when any judge reaches the 
mandatory retirement age provided by law, he shall retire and his term 
shall expire. 
(3) The governor may appoint a judge on a temporary basis upon sub-
mission of at least two names by the commission, when a judge is tempo-
rarily disabled or for any other reason unable temporarily to perform the 
duties of his office. 
( 4) If the case load rises significantly in any district due to a sudden 
influx of population or for other reasons, the governor may appoint an addi-
tional judge upon nominations made by the commission as provided in sub-
section (1) of this section. But the increase in the number of judges shall 
not become permanent unless it is approved by the legislature at its next 
session. 
(5) The salaries of temporary judges and of emergency appointees 
shall be the same as the salaries of regularly appointed judges. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 8; 1969, ch. 
158, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1969 amendment added the last 
sentence and made a minor change in 
phraseology in subsec. (2). 
Section 66 of Laws. 1965, ch. 165 pro-
vided: "This act shall take effect on 
July 1, 1965, except that sections 7 and 8 
[55-10-69 and 55-10-70] of this act shall 
take effect on May 15, 1965." 
Cross-Reference. 
Council on alcoholism and drug pro-
grams, designation of judge as member, 
63-43-5. 
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Collateral References. 
Judges~3-9. 
48 C.J.S. Judges §§ 12-23. 
Selection, qualification and tenure, 46 
Am. Jur. 2d 100-106, 258-261, Judges 
§§ 7-16, 237-240. 
55-10-70.1. Judges of juvenile court-Mandatory retirement.-A judge 
of a juvenile court shall retire upon attaining the age of seventy years 
provided, however, any judge serving a term as judge on the effective date 
of this act who has attained the age of seventy or attains that age during 
his present term shall retire on the completion of his present term. 
History: C. 1953, 55-10-70.1, enacted 
by L. 1969, ch. 159, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Laws 1969, ch. 159, contained no effec-
tive date. The act was approved Febru-
ary 25, 1969. 
Title of Act. 
An act enacting section 55-10-70.1, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, establishing a man-
datory retirement age for juvenile judges. 
Cross-Reference. 
Legislature authorized to provide for 
mandatory retirement of judges, Const. 
Art. VIII, § 28. 
Collateral References. 
Judge~lO. 
48 C.J.S. Judges § 22. 
Resignation and retirement, 46 Am. Jur. 
2d 106, Judges§ 17. 
55-10-71. Board of juvenile court judges - Members - Organization -
Powers and duties. - (1) (a) All of the juvenile court judges, except tem-
porary judges, shall constitute a board of juvenile court judges. The board 
shall annually elect one of its members to serve as the presiding judge 
and chairman of the board. Board meetings shall be held at stated times 
as determined by the board, but in any event once every three months, or 
on call of the chairman. The board shall consider and deal with problems 
that have arisen in connection with the operation of the juvenile courts in 
any district or in all districts, in order to improve the administration of 
juvenile justice in the state. 
(b) The board shall establish general policies for the operation of the 
juvenile courts and shall formulate uniform rules and forms governing 
practice and procedure, consistent with the provisions of this act and any 
rules that may be promulgated by the Supreme Court for the juvenile court. 
(c) The board shall publish and submit to the governor, the chief 
justice of the Supreme Court, and the legislature, an annual report of the 
operations of the juvenile court, which shall include financial and statistical 
data and may include suggestions and recommendations for legislation. 
(d) The board is authorized to receive and expend any funds which 
may become available from the federal government to carry out any of the 
purposes of this act, and to this end the board may meet any federal re-
quirements which may be conditions precedent to receiving such federal 
funds. 
The board may co-operate with the federal government in a program for 
training personnel employed or preparing for employment by the juvenile 
court, and may receive and expend funds from federal or state sources or 
from private donations for such purposes. The board may contract with 
public or nonprofit institutions of higher learning for the training of such 
personnel, may conduct short-term training courses of its own and may 
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hire experts on a temporary basis for such purpose, and may co-operate 
with the division of family services and other state departments or agen-
cies in personnel training programs. 
(e) The board may contract, on behalf of the state of Utah, juvenile 
court, with the United States forest service or other agencies or departments 
of the federal government, or with agencies or departments of other states, 
for the care and placement of children adjudicated under this act. 
(f) The powers to contract and expend funds shall be subject to 
budgetary control and procedures as provided by law. 
(2) The presiding judge shall have authority to set times for court 
sessions in each county and to assign judges to other districts, as provided 
in section 55-10-68; and he shall have general supervision of the juvenile 
courts to ensure uniform adherence to law and to the rules and forms 
adopted by the board, and to promote the proper and efficient functioning 
of the juvenile courts, subject to the supervisory powers of the Supreme 
Court. 
History: L. 1966, ch. 166, § 9; 1969, 
ch. 197, § 91. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1969 amendment substituted "divi-
sion of family services" for "state depart-
ment of public welfare" in subsec. (1) 
( d). 
55-10-72. Administrator of the juvenile court-Appointment-Qualifica-
tions-Powers and duties.-With the approval of the board, the presiding 
judge shall appoint a chief administrative officer of the board, who shall 
have the title of administrator of the juvenile court and shall serve at the 
pleasure of the board. The administrator shall be selected on the basis of 
professional ability and experience in the field of public administration and 
shall possess an understanding of court procedures as well as of the nature 
and significance of probation services and other court services. He shall 
devote his full time and attention to the duties of his office, and shall re-
ceive a salary determined by the board. Under the general supervision of 
the presiding judge and within the policies established by the board, the 
administrator shall prepare the budget for the juvenile court; make recom-
mendations to the presiding judge for improvements in court administration 
and court services; provide supervision and consultation to district staffs 
regarding the administration of court services, recruitment to personnel, in-
service training, and fiscal management; appoint necessary personnel to 
assist him in performing his duties, with the approval of the presiding 
judge; co-ordinate court services with the services of the state department 
of public welfare and of other agencies, both public and private, who deal 
with children; compile necessary statistics and statistical studies and pre-
pare the annual report; and perform such other duties as may be assigned 
by the presiding judge. 
History: L. 1966, ch. 166, § 10. 
55-10-73. Director of probation and clerk of court-Appointment-Du-
ties-Probation officers-Deputy clerks.-The judge of each district or the 
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judges where the court has more than one judge, shall appoint, with the 
approval of the board, a director of probation and a clerk of the court, 
except where the staff is too small to warrant the appointment of such of-
ficers, in which case the judge shall appoint such personnel as may be 
required. 
The director of probation, with the approval of the judge or the judges 
shall appoint such probation officers and other persons as may be required to 
carry out the work of the court, and the staff so appointed shall constitute 
the probation department of the court. Under the general administration 
o.f the judge, or the judges where there is more than one judge, the di-
rector of probation shall supervise the work of the probation department; 
serve as administrative officer of the probation department in such matters 
as personnel and in-service training; make recommendations to the judge 
and to the state administrator for the improvement of court services; col-
lect statistics and furnish reports requested by the court or the state ad-
ministrator; and perform such other duties as the judge shall specify. 
The efforts of the probation officer shall be directed toward the dis-
covery and correction of the causes of a child's antisocial behavior and to 
the development of the child's character and sense of responsibility, with 
the aid of any available resources in the community. 
The clerk, with the approval of the judge or judges, shall appoint such 
deputy clerks as may be required to carry on the clerical work of the 
court. The clerk shall keep a record of court proceedings and shall have 
power to issue all process and notice required. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 11. 
55-10-74. Employees of juvenile court and board of juvenile court 
judges-Salaries-Merit system for employment-Discharge or suspension. 
-(1) The salaries of employees of the court and the salaries of employees 
of the board shall be fixed by the board. 
(2) All employees of the court and of the board who receive a salary, 
except the administrator of the juvenile court and referees serving the 
court in no other capacity, shall be selected, promoted, and discharged 
through a merit system to be established for the juvenile court under the 
direction and the regulations of the Utah merit system council. 
(3) The director of probation and probation officers shall be selected 
from eligible lists establis,hed through competitive examinations conducted 
by the state merit system council on the basis of appropriate requirements 
of training in the social or behavioral sciences and on the basis of experi-
ence, personality and character, in accordance with standards set and re-
vised from time to time by the board. 
( 4) No employee under the merit system may be discharged except 
for cause and after a hearing before the appointing authority, with appeal 
to the state merit system council. An employee may be suspended pending 
such hearing and appeal. Discharge of employees appointed by the director 
of probation or the clerk shall be subject to approval by the judge or senior 
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judge; discharge of employees appointed by the court or by the adminis-
trator shall be subject to approval by the board. 
(5) All persons serving as probation officers, referees, or clerical per-
sonnel of the juvenile courts of this state prior to the effective date of this 
act, shall continue to serve the juvenile court under this act as if appointed 
in the manner prescribed by this act, and those employed under the state 
merit system shall retain their merit status without further examination. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 12. [55-10-69 and 55-10-70] of this act shall 
Compiler's Notes. 
Section 66 of Laws 1965, ch. 165 pro-
vided: "This act shall take effect on 
July 1, 1965, except that sections 7 and 8 
take effect on May 15, 1965." 
Cross-Reference. 
Merit systems, 67-13-2 et seq. 
55-10-75. Referees-A ppointment-Qualifi.cations-Duties.-The judge 
or judges in any district may appoint one or more referees to serve during 
the pleasure of the court. Every referee appointed after the effective date 
of this act shall be a graduate of an accredited law school, provided that the 
board may permit exceptions in emergency situations. The salaries of 
referees shall be fixed by the board. 
The judge may refer any case to a referee, or he may direct that all 
cases of a certain class or within a certain geographical area in his district 
shall be heard in the first instance by a referee, in the same manner as 
cases are initiated and hearings are held by the court. At the conclusion 
of the hearing before him the referee shall transmit to the judge all papers 
relating to the case, together with his findings and recommendations in 
writing. 
At the conclusion of the hearing the referee shall advise the parties 
present before him of his findings and recommendations and of their right 
to request a rehearing before the judge. A rehearing before the judge 
shall be held if a request is filed within three days after the conclusion of 
the hearing before the referee. If no hearing before the judge is requested, 
or if the right to a rehearing is waived, the findings and recommendations of 
the referee, when confirmed by an order of the judge, shall become the 
decree of the court. The judge may, on his own motion, order a rehearing 
before him of any case heard before a referee. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 13. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Section 66 of Laws 1965, ch. 165 pro-
vided: "This act shall take effect on July 
1, 1965, except that sections 7 and 8 [55-
10-69 and 55-10-70] of this act shall take 
effect on May 15, 1965." 
55-10-76. Juvenile court advisory committee-Appointment-Members 
-Terms-Duties--State juvenile court advisory committee.-The judge or 
judges of any juvenile court may appoint a juvenile court advisory com-
mittee for each district. Each advisory committee shall have no less than 
five and no more than fifteen members who shall be representative of civic 
and religious organizations, business groups, professional groups, women's 
organizations, and of other citizens interested in schools, law enforcement, 
child health, recreation, employment of youth, and other matters relating 
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to the protection and well-being of children and families in the state. 
Professional persons, if appointed to an advisory committee, shall serve in 
their capacity as citizens and not as representatives of their professional 
group, agency, or unit of government. Citizens' service organizations and 
local health, welfare, and school authorities may recommend citizens for 
appointment to ·an advisory committee, and the judges shall, to the extent 
feasible, give preference to persons so recommended. 
Of tho·se members first appointed, half ( or, if the total membership is an 
uneven number, one more than half) shall serve for a term of two years, 
and half shall serve for a term of four years. 'l'he respective terms of the 
members first appointed shall be determined by lot. Thereafter appoint-
ments shall be for four-year terms, except that vacancies before the expira-
tion of a term shall be filled for the unexpired term . .A record of committee 
appointments shall be kept by the clerk of the court. 
The board of juvenile court judges may appoint a state juvenile court 
advisory committee which shall include representatives from district ad-
visory committees to the extent fea;sible and shall have a similar composition 
of members and be set up in the same manner as district advisory commit-
tees. A record of appointments to the state advisory committee shall be 
kept in the office of the administrator of the juvenile court. 
Juvenile court advisory committees may study and make recommenda-
tions concerning the operations of the juvenile courts, including facilities 
and services used or needed for children under the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile courts, such as detention and shelter facilities, and may study 
and make recommendations in connection with community programs and 
services designed to prevent or correct juvenile delinquency and other 
children's problems which are apt to come before the juvenile court. 
Advisory committees established under this section shall act in an ad-
visory capacity and shall have no policy-making or administrative functions 
in connection with the operation of the juvenile courts or of any facilities 
serving the juvenile courts. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 14. 
55-10-77. Jurisdiction of juvenile court-Judge may sit as district court 
judge.-Except as otherwise provided by law, the court shall have exclu-
sive original jurisdiction in proceedings: 
(1) Concerning any child who has violated any federal, state, or local 
law or municipal ordinance, or any person under twenty-one years of age 
who has violated any such law or ordinance before becoming eighteen years 
of age, regardless of where the violation occurred. 
(2) Concerning any child: 
(a) who is a neglected or dependent child, as defined in section 55-10-
64; or 
(b) who is beyond the control of his parent, guardian, or other lawful 
custodian to the point that his behavior or condition is such as to en-
danger his own welfare or the welfare of others; or 
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(c) who is a habitual truant from school. 
(3) Concerning any parent or parents of a child committed to the state 
industrial school, in so far as to order, at the discretion of the court and on 
the recommendation of the state industrial school, the parent or parents of a 
child committed to the state industrial school for a custodial term, to m1-
dergo group rehabilitation therapy under the direction of the state in-
dustrial school therapist, who has supervision of tha-t parent or parents' 
child, or such other therapist that the court may direct, for a period di-
rected by the court as recommended by the state industrial school. 
(4) To determine the custody of any child or appoint a guardian of 
the person or other guardian of any child who comes within the court's 
jurisdiction under other provisions of this section. 
(5) To terminate the legal parent-child relationship, including termi-
nation of residual parental rights and duties as defined herein. 
(6) For judicial consent to the marriage, employment, or enlistment of 
a child when such consent is required by law. 
(7) For the treatment or commitment of a mentally defective or men-
tally ill child who comes within the court's jurisdiction under other pro-
visions of this section. 
(8) Under the Interstate Compact on Juveniles. 
Any judge of the juvenile court may at the request of any judge of 
district court, sit as a judge of the district court and shall have the same 
powers as the judge thereof. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 15; 1971, ch. 
134, § 1; 1973, ch. 120, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1971 amendment inserted "is be-
yond the control of his parent, guardian, 
or other lawful custodian to the point that 
his" before "behavior or condition" in 
subd. (2) (b); deleted "or who has run 
away from his home or who is otherwise 
beyond the control of his parent, custo-
dian, or school authorities" at the end 
of subd. (2)(c); and made a minor change 
in phraseology. 
The 1973 amendment added the last 
paragraph. 
Dependency. 
Juvenile court erred in exercising exclu-
sive jurisdiction where the finding of de-
pendency of a child was premised solely 
on the inability of the father to furnish 
his children with personal guidance and 
care because of his incarceration despite 
father's arrangement for the care of his 
children with relatives whose home was 
found to provide a fine, stable, and com-
fortable environment. In re State in 
Interest of Valdez, 29 U. (2d) 63, 504 P. 
2d 1372. 
District court custody jurisdiction. 
Juvenile court does not have exclusive 
original jurisdiction in proceedings to de-
termine the custody of child where district 
court, after first having assumed original 
jurisdiction, refened custody question to 
juvenile court for investigation and rec-
ommendation; in such case, opinion of 
juvenile court is advisory only and the 
district court must make final determina-
tion. In re State in Interest of Thornton, 
18 U. (2d) 297, 422 P. 2d 199. 
Traffic violations. 
City courts have concurrent jurisdiction 
with juvenile court in cases where chil-
dren less than eighteen years old are 
charged with traffic violations in view of 
section of Juvenile Act making cases in-
volving traffic violations an exception 
to general rule that juvenile court shall 
have exclusive original jurisdiction in 
proceedings concerning any child who has 
violated any federal, state or local law 
or municipal ordinance. Dimmitt v. City 
Court of Salt Lake City, 21 U. (2d) 257, 
444 P. 2d 461. 
Collateral References. 
Infants,e=>18. 
43 C.J.S. Infants § 6. 
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Jurisdiction, 47 Am. Jur. 2d 995-1001, 
Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and De-
pendant Children §§ 16-21. 
Age of child at time of alleged offense 
or delinquency, or at time of legal pro-
ceedings, as criterion of jurisdiction of 
juvenile court, 89 A. L. R. 2d 506. 
Jurisdiction of another court over child 
as affected by assumption of jurisdiction 
by juvenile court, 11 A. L. R. 147, 78 A. 
L. R. 317, 146 A. L. R. 1153. 
Marriage as affecting jurisdiction of 
juvenile court over delinquent or depend-
ent, 14 A. L. R. 2.d 336. 
Power of juvenile court to exercise con-
tinuing jurisdiction over infant delinquent 
or offender, 76 A. L. R. 657. 
Removal of child from state pending 
proceedings for custody as defeating juris-
diction to award custody, 171 A. L. R. 
1405. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Construction. 
The pronoun "he," as used in former 
jurisdiction statute, included the female 
gender. Any other construction would 
have excluded females from the terms 
delinquent, neglected and dependent chil-
dren. Chatwin v. Terry, 107 U. 340, 153 
P. 2d 941, followed and approved in In 
re State in Interest of Johnson, 110 U. 
500, 175 P. 2d 486. 
Acquisition of jurisdiction. 
To bring a child within the power of the 
juvenilo court certain steps wero to be 
taken. A preliminary inquiry was to be 
made under the direction of the proba-
tion division and, wherever practicable, a 
prelimina1·y investigation of the home and 
a report in writing :filed by the probation 
officer. A petition was to be :filed; to in-
voke the court's jurisdiction it was neces-
sary that the petition allege facts which 
would make children either neglected, de-
pendent or delinquent as defined by stat-
ute. In re State in Interest of Graham, 
110 U. 159, 170 P. 2d 172, followed and 
approved in In re State in Interest of 
Johnson, ll0 U. 500, 175 P. 2d 486 with 
respect to required allegations in peti-
tion. 
The jurisdiction of the juvenile court 
over a child was a prerequisite to obtain-
ing jurisdiction of that child's parent. In 
re State in Interest of Graham, UO U. 
159, 170 P. 2d 172. 
Petition which did not allege that child 
in question was homeless, or destitute, 
or without proper support or care through 
no fault of his parent, but merely state,d 
that "the mother is financially unable to 
provide a :fit and proper home for said 
child," did not allege sufficient grounds 
for depriving mother of custody. "A par-
ent might suddenly suffer :financial re-
vorses. That is not ground for depriving 
her of the custody of her child." In re 
State in Interest of Johnson, ll0 U. 500, 
175 P. 2d 486. 
An allegation that the child was "wholly 
without legal guardianship in the state of 
Utah," was duplicitous and surplusage, ill 
face of allegation that the child had a 
mother. In re State in Interest of John-
son, ll0 U. 500, 175 P. 2d 486. 
Allegation in petition that other rela-
tives or friends provided care for child 
neglected by parent did not negative 
averment that parent had neglected his 
parental responsibilities. In re Olson, 111 
U. 365, 180 P. 2d 210. 
Petition, alleging facts showing that 
child was neglected by her father and 
that third person was providing care for 
her, was sufficient to confer jurisdiction 
on juvenile court to conduct inquiry into 
status and well-being of child, even 
though petition failed to state facts suffi-
cient to show that child was "dependent 
child." In re Olson, lll U. 365, 180 P. 2d 
210, citing In re Bradley, 109 U. 538, 167 
P. 2d 978. 
Husband and wife jointly held some de-
gree of custodial control over a chi] d re-
ceived by them from the mother who had 
given invalid consent to their adoption 
of the child and the service of a writ of 
habeas corpus on the husband personally 
while he was within the court's jurisdic-
tion gave the court jurisdiction to deter-
mine custody. Application of Morse, 7 U. 
(2d) 312, 324 P. 2d 773. 
In a proceeding to determine whether 
a child was neglected and best committed 
to the state welfare department for place-
ment for purpose of adoption, allegations 
that the child had been abandoned by her 
father and that her mother had not con-
tributed to her support were sufficient to 
confer jurisdiction on the juvenile court. 
In re State in Interest of 0-, 9 U. (2d) 
345, 344 P. 2d 981. 
Contribution for support. 
Juvenile court had authority to require 
father to contribute to support of neg· 
lected child even though custody was 
awarded to third person; however it was 
necessary that father have been given 
adequate notice of proceeding before juve-
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Court record and presumptions. 
As juvenile courts were courts of limited 
,jurisdiction, it was necessary that the 
record of a case before such a court af-
firmatively show that it had the required 
jurisdiction of the children and parents 
~t the time it made determinations affect-
ing the rights of those parties. Sup_reI?e 
Court on appeal would not presume Juris-
diction of the juvenile court but would 
closely examine the record to see that 
the legislatively specified actions had been 
taken and the necessary facts were al-
leged and found to give said court juris-
diction in the particular case. In re State 
in Interest of Graham, 110 U. 159, 170 P. 
2d 172, in which Mr. Justice Wolfe ex-
amined with great care the record of the 
juvenile court which came to the Supreme 
Court in that case. He found that great 
"liberties" had been taken with the rec-
ord· that there had been changes, altera-
tio~s and interlineations therein, and 
warned of the importance of preserving 
the integrity of the files of such a court. 
Effect of marriage of delinquent. 
Marriage of juvenile delinquent did 
not take away jurisdiction of juvenile 
court over delinquent until child reached 
majority. Stoker v. Gowans, 45 U. 556, 
147 P. 911, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 1025, fol-
lowed and approved in Chatwin v. Terry, 
107 U. 340, 153 P. 2d 941, and court took 
jurisdiction over a delinquent juvenile, 
who was married, but under 21 years of 
age. Chatwin v. Terry was followed and 
approved in In re State in Interest of 
Johnson, 110 U. 500, 175 P. 2d 486. 
Exclusive jurisdiction of juvenile court. 
The legislature intended to confer ex-
clusive original jurisdiction to determine 
questions of custody of children and of 
parent's fitness and qualification to have 
child returned to him, in every case where-
in the state became a party by the juve-
nile court taking custody of a child be-
cause of neglect or delinquency. Accord-
ingly, where juvenile court obtained juris-
diction of a child because of neglect, 
dependency or delinquency, district court 
was required to dismiss writ of habeas 
corpus. Jensen v. Sevy, 103 U. 220, 134 
P. 2d 1081. 
Jurisdiction of district court with respect 
to custody. 
In an action brought by a grandfather 
to appoint a guardian of children's es-
tates and persons, where the grandfather 
alleged in his petition that the• natural 
guardian, the father, was not a fit person 
to have custody, the district c.ourt had 
jurisdiction to determine whether the 
father, who had custody, should retain it. 
In re O'Hare's Guardianship, 9 U. (2d) 
181, 341 P. 2d 205. 
J'uvenile court as committing magistrate. 
Under statute (Laws 1919 (S. S.), ch. 5, 
§ 7) providing that the juvenile court 
should act as committing magistrate with 
same jurisdiction as a justice of the peace 
sitting as a committing magistrate, juve-
nile court did not have exclusive jurisdic-
tion to act as committing magistrate so 
that where preliminary hearing was had 
before city judge, it could not be contended 
that defendant, a juvenile, did not have 
preliminary hearing as guaranteed by 
Const. Art. I, § 13. State v. Tweed, 63 U. 
176, 224 P. 443. 
Nature and extent of jurisdiction. 
Arrest of five-year-old child in custody 
of mother, upon complaint of sheriff alleg-
ing facts insufficient to constitute delin-
quency, and without warrant, upon mere 
oral order of juvenile court, and remand-
ing child to custody of probation officer 
without any determination of delinquency 
and refusal to admit child to bail, was be-
yond jurisdiction of juvenile court and 
required granting of habeas corpus writ 
to obtain discharge of child. Cooke v. 
Cooke, 67 U. 371, 248 P. 83. 
Juvenile courts were creatures of stat-
ute and courts of limited jurisdiction; 
they did not have jurisdiction over every 
minor child or of every parent of a minor 
child. In re State in Interest of Graham, 
110 U. 159, 170 P. 2d 172. 
The law contemplated a then existing 
condition of dependency that required the 
intervention of the juvenile court. In re 
State in Interest of Johnson, llO U. 500, 
175 P. 2d 486. 
Juvenile court was created by statute, 
its powers were conferred thereby, and it 
required no license from executive branch 
of government to carry out its judicial 
functions. In re Olson, 111 U. 365, 180 P. 
2d 210. 
While statute conferred jurisdiction on 
juvenile courts in certain cases where 
parent was not blameworthy, it certainly 
was designed to confer jurisdiction where 
parent was able to provide care and super-
vision and was recreant to his parental 
duties by failure to provide such support. 
In re Olson, 111 U. 365, 180 P. 2d 210. 
Fact that third person might be provid-
ing care for child by reason of neglect of 
parent did not deprive juvenile court of 
jurisdiction to inquire into welfare of such 
child and to fix responsibility and deter-
mine proper custody for child within 
scope of its statutory authority. In re 
Olson, 111 U. 365, 180 P. 2d 210. 
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Where father of child, which had been 
living with maternal grandparents since 
death of mother, did not traverse allega-
tions of petition that he had neglected to 
support child for eight years, and did not 
file application for custody, juvenile court 
had authority to determine custody upon 
estabfoihment of alleged neglect and to fix 
responsibility for such custody. In re 
Olson, 111 U. 365, 180 P. 2d 210. 
Once the juvenile court, which had ex-
clusive original jurisdiction in matters in-
volving the dependency, neglect and/or 
delinquency of children, assumed juris-
diction of children whose dependency, 
neglect or delinquency was in issue, the 
matters of (1) fitness of persons to have 
custody and (2) the welfare of the minors 
were matters appealable directly to Sup-
reme Court and not reviewable by the dis-
trict court in habeas corpus proceedings. 
Black v. Anderson, 3 U. (2d) 42, 277 P. 
2d 975. 
Offenses by child under eighteen years old. 
Former statute was cited and relied 
upon for the proposition that a person 
under eighteen years of age, who violated 
the law, was merely a "delinquent child" 
or a "juvenile," and had not committed a 
crime or public offense. The statutory 
exception giving juvenile and district 
courts concurrent jurisdiction where child 
"fourteen years of age or older" committed 
a felony was noted. Sanders v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 104 U. 75, 138 P. 2d 
239. 
District court had no jurisdiction to try 
and sentence defendants who were under 
eighteen years of age at the time the 
offense was committed. As to such defend-
ants the case should have been transferred 
to the juvenile court. State v. Musser, 110 
U. 534, 175 P. 2d 724, judgment of Supreme 
Court vacated and cause remanded to that 
court to pass on certain questions involv-
ing validity of former criminal conspiracy 
statute in 333 U. S. 95, 92 L. Ed. 562, 68 
S. Ct. 397. 
Offenses by twelve-year-old child. 
Twelve-year-old could violate law and 
commit offense against person or property 
the same as an adult person, and defense 
of justification on part of defendant who 
shot boy attempting to burglarize his 
rabbit pens was available under former 
justifiable homicide statute. State v. Ter-
rell, 55 U. 314, 186 P. 108, 25 A. L. R. 
497. 
Privileges of minor. 
On petition for writ of habeas corpus, 
where it appeared that petitioner was 
adjudged in contempt of court for failing 
to answer question whether defendant, iu 
prosecution for having carnal knowledge 
of petitioner, hacl had sexual intercourse 
with petitioner on dates other than the 
date of the offense being tried, held the 
objection on grounds of relevancy to the 
question should have been sustained, and 
petitioner's plea of privilege should have 
been allowed, for although petitioner was 
a minor, she would be subjected to deg-
radation had she testified in the affirma-
tive, and although she was below the age 
to consent to the crime charged against 
defendant, she was susceptible of being 
proceeded against in the juvenile court. 
In re Sadleir, 97 U. 291, 85 P. 2d 810, affd. 
97 U. 313, 94 P. 2d 161. 
Raising and waiving objections. 
Even in absence of an assignment of 
ei-ror, the Supreme Court of tl1is state 
would take cognizance of the want of juris-
diction of the district court to try and 
sentence persons under the age of eighteen 
years at the time the offense was allegedly 
committed. State v. Musser, 110 U. 534, 
175 P. 2d 724, judgment of Supreme Court 
vacated and c,ause remanded to that 
court to pass on certain questions involv-
ing validity of former criminal conspiracy 
statute in 333 U. S. 95, 92 L. Ed. 562, 68 S. 
Ct. 397. 
55-10-78. Jurisdiction of district court-Determination of custody ques-
tions by juvenile court-District court judge may sit as juvenile court 
judge.-When a person eighteen years of age or over who is under the 
continuing jurisdiction of the juvenile court pursuant to section 55-10-100 
violates any federal, state or local law or municipal ordinance, the district 
court or other court exercising jurisdiction over the offense involved shall 
have concurrent jurisdiction with the juvenile court. 
Nothing contained in this act shall deprive the district courts of juris-
diction in adoption proceedings. 
Nothing contained in this act shall deprive the district courts of juris-
diction to appoint a guardian for a child, nor of jurisdiction to determine 
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the custody of a child upon writ of habeas corpus or when the quesrtion of 
custody is incidental to the determination of a cause in the district court; 
provided that in case a petition involving the same child is pending in the 
juvenile court or the juvenile court has previously acquired continuing 
jurisdiction over the same child, the district court shall certify the question 
of custody to the juvenile court for determination. 
A district court may at any time decline to pass upon a question of cus-
tody and may certify that question to the juvenile court for a determination 
or recommendation. 
Where a custody award has been made in a district court in a divorce 
action or in another proceeding and the jurisdiction of the district court 
in the case is continuing, the juvenile court may nevertheless acquire juris-
diction in a case involving the same child if the child is dependent or neg-
lected or otherwise comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court pur-
suant to section 55-10-77 and may by order change the custody, support 
and visitation rights previously ordered in the district court under the 
following conditions: 
(a) that written notice of the pending juvenile court hearing is given 
to the parties to the divorce action and the district court at least ten days 
before the hearing, and 
(b) that no written objection to the hearing is filed with the juvenile 
court by either the parties to the divorce action or the district court. 
Upon the filing of a copy of the findings and order of the juvenile 
court with the district court, the findings and order of the juvenile court 
shall be binding on the parties to the divorce action as though entered in 
the district court. 
If objection to the juvenile court hearing is filed with the juvenile 
court within the ten-day period, the juvenile court shall refer the entire 
matter to the district court for disposition. Upon receipt by the juvenile 
court of written notification that the district court will hear and dispose of 
the matter, the jurisdiction of the juvenile court will terminate. If the 
district court determines that despite the objections of the parties the 
interests of the state and the welfare of the child or children will best be 
served by the juvenile court hearing the matter and making final dis-
position, it may refer the matter back to the juvenile court and the findings 
and order of the juvenile court shall be binding on the parties when filed 
with the district court as stated above. 
Any district judge may, at the request of any judge of the juvenile court, 
sit as judge of the juvenile court and shall have the same powers as the 
judge thereof. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 16; 1971, ch. 
134, § 2; 1973, ch. 120, § 2. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1971 amendment added the last part 
of the fifth paragraph and the sixth and 
seventh paragraphs providing for the es-
tablishment of certain procedures between 
the juvenile and district courts to elim.i-
nate conflicting dispositions in child cus-
tody matters. 
The 1973 amendment added the last par-
agraph. 
Private proceedings in foreign state. 
Even on behalf of impecunious mother, 
juvenile court had no authority to obli-
gate public moneys to assist in private 
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proceedings in Texas to regain custody of 
child. State in Interest of Keeran v. De-
Valmont, 27 U. (2d) 347, 496 P. 2d 265. 
Collateral References. 
Courts0=>248. 
21 C.J.S. Courts § 466. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Compensation of custodian of child. 
Where unwed mother fourteen years of 
age relinquished her baby, with reserva-
tion of consent to adoption, to good people 
but obtained custody in juvenile court pro-
ceeding, the juvenile court should have 
done something to restore to the good 
people their out-of-pocket expense up to 
the time mother made demand for return 
of her baby, but not as a condition to 
relinquishment of custody to the mother. 
State ex rel. London v. Bell, 15 U. (2d) 
243, 390 P. 2d 856. 
Custody of child. 
Unwed mother fourteen years of age, 
who had signed a document that connoted 
an apparent relinquishment of her child 
within 48 hours of its birth, with reser-
vation of consent to adoption, had not 
abandoned or neglected the child. State 
ex rel. London v. Bell, 15 U. (2d) 243, 390 
P. 2d 856. 
District court retains jurisdiction. 
When the district court had taken juris-
diction of a matter involving children, 
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court could 
be invoked and it could act in the interest 
of any children in circumstances covered 
by 55-10-77, but the action taken by the 
juvenile court in such a case was supple-
mentary to the action of the district court, 
and the juvenile court could not make 
orders in direct conflict with tho•se of the 
district court, nor did the authority of 
the juvenile court supersede that of the 
district court, or divest the district court 
of jurisdiction. Anderson v. Anderson, 18 
U. (2d) 89, 416 P. 2d 308. 
Having once assumed original jurisdic-
tion over question of custody of minor, 
district court could refer case to juvenile 
court for investigation and recommenda-
tion, but in so doing district court did 
not divest itself of further jurisdiction 
and juvenile court was required to return 
matter to district court for final determi-
nation; word "determination" in statute 
providing that "a district court may at 
any time decline to pass upon a question 
of custody and may certify that question 
to the juvenile court for determination or 
recommendation" did not mean that once 
case was referred to juvenile court, deci-
sion of that court was final. In re Sta.te 
in Interest of Thornton, 18 U. (2d) 297, 
422 P. 2d 199. 
Order in conflict with district court order. 
Where the juvenile court's jurisdiction 
was invoked to determine the custody and 
support of children of divorced parents 
and the district court had continuing 
jurisdiction over the same matter, such 
exercise of jurisdiction by the juvenile 
court was not exclusive and did not 
deprive the district court of further au· 
thority in the case, and an order by the 
district court which was contrary to an 
order by the juvenile court in such case 
would prevail. Anderson v. Anderson, 18 
U. (2d) 89, 416 P. 2d 308. 
55-10-79. Criminal proceedings involving children-Transfer to juvenile 
court.-If during the pendency of a criminal or quasi-criminal proceeding 
in another court, including a preliminary hearing, it shall be ascertained 
that the person charged is under twenty-one years of age and was less than 
eighteen years of age at the time of committing the alleged offense, that 
court shall transfer the case to the juvenile court, together with all the 
papers, documents, and transcripts of any testimony connected therewith. 
The court making the transfer shall order the person to be taken forthwith 
to the juvenile court or to the place of detention designated by the juvenile 
court, or shall release him to the custody of his parent or guardian or other 
person legally responsible for him, to be brought before the juvenile 
court at a time designated by it. That court shall then proceed as provided 
in this act. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 17. Collateral References. 
Homicide by juvenile as within juris-


















DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
55-10-80 
Crimes by children under eighteen years. 
A person under eighteen years of age 
who violated the law was merely a "de-
linquent child" or a "juvenile" and had 
not committed a crime or public offense. 
Sanders v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 
104 U. 75, 138 P. 2d 239. 
District court had no jurisdiction to 
try and sentence defendants who were 
under eighteen years of age at time of-
fense was committed. As to such defend-
ants the case should have been transferred 
to the juvenile court. State v. Musser, 
110 U. 534, 175 P. 2d 724, judgment of 
Supreme Court vacated and cause re-
manded to that court to pass on certain 
questions involving validity of former 
criminal conspiracy statute in 333 U. S. 
95, 92 L. Ed. 562, 68 S. Ct. 397. 
Nature of proceedings. 
Under Laws 1905, p. 182, ch. 117, creat-
ing juvenile courts, proceedings of juvenile 
courts did not come within what was 
known as criminal proceedings nor were 
children considered as criminals. Mill v. 
Brown, 31 U. 473, 88 P. 609, 120 Am. St. 
Rep. 935. 
55-10-80. Offenses against children by adults-Jurisdiction of juvenile 
court--Penalties.-The court shall have jurisdiction to try the following 
adults for offenses committed against children: 
(1) Any person eighteen years of age or over wbo induces, aids, or 
encourages a child to violate any federal, state, or local law or municipal 
ordinance, or who tends to cause children to become or remain delinquent, 
or who aids, contributes to, or becomes responsible for the neglect or de-
linquency of any child; 
(2) Any person eighteen years or over, having a child in his legal 
custody, or in his employment, who willfully abuses or ill-treats, neglects or 
abandons such child in any manner likely to cause the child unnecessary 
suffering or serious injury to his health or morals; 
(3) Any person eighteen years or over who forcibly takes away a child 
from, or encourages him to leave, the legal or physical custody of any per-
son, agency, or institution in which the child has been legally placed for 
the purpose of care, support, education, or adoption, or any person who 
knowingly detains or harbors such child. 
Any person who commits any act described above in this section, shall 
be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
county jail not exceeding six months or by a fine not exceeding $299, or by 
both. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 18. 
Contributing to delinquency of minor. 
Where defendant, an osteopathic physi-
cian, gave prescriptions for excessive 
quantities of amphetamines and barbitu-
rates to a seventeen-year-old boy without 
making effort to determine whether he was 
a juvenile, nor whether he was giving his 
true name and address, the defendant 
aided and encouraged the juvenile to vio-
late 58-17-14.13 by using a false name to 
procure drugs, and, where defendant's con-
duct. was shown to be "criminal negli-
genee," he was guilty of contributing to 
the clelinqnency of a minor. State v. Tritt, 
~3 U. (2d) 365, 463 P. 2d 806, 36 A. L. R. 
3d 1283. 
Proof beyond reasonable doubt. 
Prosecution had burden of proving de-
fendant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt 
in juvenile court proceeding on charge of 
contributing to delinquency of minor since, 
in such cases, juvenile court is required 
to conform to practice and procedure for 
criminal proceedings in district court. 
State v. Taylor, 21 U. (2d) 425, 446 P. 2d 
954. 
Sheltering runaway child. 
Providing shelter to runaway child as 
part of church program for alienated 
youth dirl not constitute violation of suhd. 
(1) where child was not induced or en-
couraged to run away, did not engage in 
unlawful or immoral behavior, and was 
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not exposed to unlawful or immoral ac-
tivity on the part of others; defendants 
had no duty to investigate child's age or 
residence or to report her to parents or 
authorities. State v. Macri, 28 U. (2d) 68, 
498 P. 2d 355. 
Collateral References. 
Infantse::>18. 
43 C.J.S. Infants § 6. 
55-10-81. Offenses against children by adults-Practice and procedure in 
juvenile court.-In proceedings in adult cases the practice· and procedure 
of the juvenile court shall conform to the practice and procedure provided 
by law or rule of court for criminal proceedings in the district court, except 
that the proceedings may be commenced by complaint and a tri·al jury 
shall consist of four jurors. The county attorney shall prosecute any case 
under this section and section 55-10-80. 
The court may have a preliminary investigation made by the probation 
department or other agency designated by the court, and with the con-
sent of the defendant or person involved may permit such nonjudicial ad-
justment as may be practicable, without prosecution. 
If the defendant in proceedings under this· section shall demand a jury 
trial, the court may transfer the case to a city court or county court if such 
a court is in existence in the county in which the alleged offense was 
committed. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 19. 
Cross-Reference .. 
County attorney to prosecute adults 
contributing to delinquency, 17-18-1. 
Proof beyond reasonable doubt. 
Prosecution had burden of proving de-
fendant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt in 
juvenile court proceeding on charge of 
contributing to delinquency of minor since, 
in such cases, juvenile court is required to 
conform to practice and procedure for 
criminal proceedings in district court. 
State v. Taylor, 21 U. (2d) 425, 446 P. 2d 
954. 
55-10-82. Felony against or involving child-County or city attorney 
to notify juvenile court.-Whenever a felony or other crime has been 
committed against a child or involving a child, and the case is within 
the jurisdiction of a district court or other court of this state, it shall 
be the duty of the county attorney or city attorney who handles the 
proceedings to inform the juvenile court immediately upon rece1vmg 
knowledge of the offense so that the juvenile court may take any pro-
tective measures which may be within its jurisdiction. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 20; 1971, 
ch. 135, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1971 amendment deleted "district 
attorney" before "county attorney." 
Effective Date. 
Section 2 of Laws l 971, ch. 135 pro-
vided: "This act shall take effect January 
1, 1973." 
55-10-83. Petition to commence children's cases-Preliminary inquiry-
Nonjudicial adjustments-Violations of motor vehicle laws, fish and game 
laws and boating laws.-(1) Proceedings in children's cases are commenced 
by petition. 
(2) ,Vhenever the court is informed by a peace officer or any other per-
son that a child is or appears to be within the court's jurisdiction, the pro-
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bation department shall make a preliminary inquiry to determine whether 
the interests of the public or of the child require that further action be 
taken. 
On the basis of the preliminary inquiry the court may authorize a peti-
tion to be filed, or the court may, through its probation department, make 
such nonjudicial ·adjustment of the ease as is practicable without a petition, 
provided that the facts are admitted and establish prima facie jurisdiction, 
and provided that consent is obtained from the parents or other custodian 
and also from the child if of sufficient age and understanding. Efforts to 
effect such nonjudicial adjustment may not extend for ·a period of more 
than two months without leave of a judge of the court who may extend 
the period for an additional two months. The probation department is not 
authorized in connection with any nonjudicial adjustment to compel any 
person to appear at any conference, produce any papers, or to visit any 
place. 
(3) In cases of violations of motor vehicle laws or ordinances, fish and 
game laws, and boating laws, a preliminary investigation shall not be re-
quired unless requested by the court, and in the case of violations of motor 
vehicle laws or ordinances a petition shall not be required and the issuance 
of a traffic citation or summons shall be sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction 
of the court. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 21. Collateral References. 
Initial pleading, 47 Am. Jnr. 2d 1017, 
Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and De-
pendant Children § 40. 
Constitutionality. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Compliance with section. 
Former Juvenile Court Act (Laws 1905, 
p. 182, ch. 117) was not rendered un-
constitutional by fact that it did not 
provide for trial by jury, arraignment and 
plea, warrant anc1 notice, nor because of 
manner of trial anc1 examination and child 
being required as witness. Mill v. Brown, 
31 U. 473, 88 P. 609, 120 Am. St. Rep. 935. 
Allegations of petition. 
Former section "requiring 'the facts 
which bring the child within the jurisdic-
tion of the court' to be alleged" did not 
require all the evidentiary facts and de-
tails to be set out in the petition. Neither 
did it contemplate that only the bare legal 
or factual conclusions should be alleged. 
Rather the statute required sufficient facts 
to be alleged so that the reader of the 
petition could determine whether or not 
the children involved would be "depend-
ent," "neglected" or "delinquent" if the 
facts alleged were true. In re State in 
Interest of Graham, 110 U. 159, 170 P. 2d 
172, followed and approved in In re State 
in Interest of Johnson, 110 U. 500, 175 P. 
2d 486, quoting language of petition at 
length. 
Complianee with section relating to pre-
liminary inquiries and petition was neces-
sary to bring a child within the power of 
the juvenile court. In re State in Interest 
of Graham, 110 U. 159, 170 P. 2d 172. 
Drawing the petition. 
It was not necessary that the petition 
be drawn by one learned in the law; it 
should show in plain and clear language 
the facts or situation which reveal de-
pendency, neglect or delinquency. An in-
telligent layman should be able to do that. 
In re State in Interest of Graham, 110 U. 
159, 170 P. 2d 172, followed in In re State 
in Interest of Johnson, 110 U. 500, 175 P. 
2d 486, setting out at length language of 
petition. 
Notice of hearing. 
Where a summons was issued and served 
upon a juvenile and his parents notifying 
them that the juvenile was charged with 
violating the conditions of his probation 
and describing the charged violations, t.he 
summons provided adequate notice of the 
purpose of the hearing at which a previous 
probation was revoked, and it was not 
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necessary that the notice expressly state tion. In Interest of Lindh, 11 U. (2.d) 385, 
that the hearing was to revoke the proba- 359 P. 2d 1058. 
55-10-84. Title of petition and other court documents-Form and con-
tents of petition-Order for temporary custody-Physical or psychological 
examination of child, parent or guardian-Dismissal of petition.-The peti-
tion and all subsequent court documents in the proceeding shall be entitled: 
"State of Utah, in the interest of --------------------, a person under eighteen 
years of age ( or a person under twenty-one years of age)." The petition 
shall be verified. The statements in the petition may be made upon informa-
tion and belief. 
The petition shall set forth in simple and brief language the facts which 
bring the child within the jurisdiction of the court, as provided in section 
55-10-77. The petition shall further state: (a) the name, age, and residence 
of the child; (b) the names and residences of his parents,; ( c) the name and 
residence of his guardian, if there is one; (d) the name and address of 
the nearest known relative, if no parent or guardian is known; and ( e) the 
name and residence of the person having physical custody of the child. If 
any of the facts herein required to be stated are not known by the peti-
tioner, the petition shall so state. 
At any time after a petition is filed, the court may make an order pro-
viding for temporary custody of the child. 
'l'he court may order that a child concerning whom a petition has been 
filed shall be examined by a physician, surgeon, psychiatrist, or psychologist, 
and may place the child in a hospital or other facility for such examination. 
After due notice and a hearing set for the specific purpose, the court 
may order a similar examination of a parent or guardian whose ability to 
care for a child is at issue, if the court finds from the evidence presented at 
the hearing that the parent's or guardian's physical, mental, or emotional 
condition may be a factor in causing the neglect, dependency, or delin-
quency of the child. 
The court may dismiss a petition at any stage of the proceedings. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 22. 
Appeal from order for psychological exam-
ination, 
In a juvenile court proceeding for the 
purpose of determining whether or not 
children were neglected or dependent, an 
order that the mother of the subject 
children submit to a psychological exam-
ination against her will was not a final 
order appealable to the Supreme Court 
under 55-10-112. In re State in Interest of 
Persinger, 19 U. (2d) 186, 429 P. 2d 37. 
55-10-85. Venue of children's cases-Transfer or certification to other 
districts.-Proceedings in children's cases shall be commenced in the court 
of the district in which the child is living or is found, or in which an 
alleged violation of law or ordinance occurred. 
When a child resides outside the court district in which a petition has 
been filed, but resides iu the state, or when a child's residence is changed 
to another court district after the petition is filed, the court may, in its 
discretion, transfer tlie case to the court of the district in which the child 
resides; or the court may, in its discretion, after adjudication certify the 
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case for disposition to the court of the district in which the child resides. 
The transferring or certifying court shall transmit all documents and legal 
and social records, or certified copies thereof, to the receiving court, where-
upon the receiving court shall proceed with the case as if the petition had 
been originally filed or the adjudication had been originally made in that 
court. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 23. 
55-10-86. Felony committed by child-Hearing and certification to dis-
trict court.-If the petition in the case of a person fourteen years of age or 
older alleges that he committed an act which would constitute a felony if 
committed by an adult, and if the court after full investigation and a hear-
ing finds that it would be contrary to the best interests of the child or of the 
public to retain jurisdiction, the court may enter an order certifying to that 
effect and directing that the child be held for criminal proceedings in the 
district court, with a hearing before a committing magistrate to be held as 
in other felony cases. The provisions of section 55-10-96 and other pro-
visions relating to proceedings in children's cases shall, to the extent they 
are pertinent, be applicable to the hearing held under this section. 
When a criminal complaint is filed in a court of competent jurisdic-
tion charging the child with the offense certified under this section, the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court is terminated as to the child or person 
concerned. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 24; 1971, ch. 
134, § 3. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1971 amendment substituted "When 
a criminal complaint is filed * * * under 
this section" for "When a case is certified 
under this section" at the beginning of 
the second paragraph. 
Collateral References. 
Infants<§::;;;>65. 
43 C.J.S. Infants § 94. 
Homicide by juvenile as within juris-
diction of juvenile court, 48 A. L. R. 2d 
663. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Extent of court's jurisdiction. 
Under predecessor section juvenile court 
had no authority or jurisdiction to pro-
ceed with a trial or to pronounce judg-
ment on the alleged delinquent; its juris-
diction was limited to that of a commit-
ting magistrate. Appeal of McKendrick, 
75 U. 34, 282 P. 784, following State v. 
Tweed, 63 U. 176, 224 P. 443. 
55-10-87. Summons-Issuance and contents-Emergency medical or sur-
gical treatment---Compulsory process for attendance of witnesses, when 
authorized-Expenses of witnesses.-(1) After a petition is filed the court 
shall promptly issue a summons, unless the judge directs that a further 
investigation is needed. No summons is required as to any person who ap-
pears voluntarily or who files a written waiver of service with the clerk of 
the court at or prior to the hearing. 
(2) The summons shall contain the name of the court, the title of the 
proceedings, and ( except for a published summons) a brief statement of the 
substance of the allegations in the petition. A published summons shall 
simply state that a proceeding concerning the child is pending in the court 
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and an adjudication will be made. The summons shall require the person 
or persons who have physical custody of the child to appear personally and 
bring the child before the court at a time and place stated. If the person 
or persons so summoned are not the parent, parents, or guardian of the 
child, then summons shall also be issued to the parent, parents, or guardian, 
as the case may be, notifying them of the pendency of the case and of the 
time and place set for the hearing. 
(3) Summons may be issued requiring the appearance of any other 
person whose presence the court deems necessary. 
( 4) If it appears to the court that the welfare of the child or of the 
public requires that the child be taken into custody, the court may by en-
dorsement upon the summons direct that the person serving the summons 
take the child into custody at once. 
(5) Upon the sworn testimony of one or more reputable physicians, 
the court may order emergency medical or surgical treatment which is im-
mediately necessary for a child concerning whom a petition has been filed 
pending the service of summons upon his parents, guardian, or custodian. 
( 6) A parent or guardian shall be entitled to the issuance of compul-
sory process for the attendance of witnesses on his own behalf or on behalf 
of the child. A guardian ad litem or a probation officer shall be entitled to 
compulsory process for the attendance of witnesses on behalf of the child. 
(7) The court may authorize the payment of necessary travel expenses 
incurred by persons summoned or otherwise required to appear at the hear-
ing of a case under this act, which payment shall not exceed the amount 
allowed to witnesses for travel in other courts. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 25. 
Collateral References. 
Process and notice of hearing, 47 Am. 
Jnr. 2d 1019, Juvenile Courts and Delin-
quent and Dependent Children § 43. 
Right of parent to notice and hearing 
before being deprived of custody of child, 
76 A. L. R. 242. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Jurisdiction over parents. 
Pormer statute provided for the· obtain-
ing of jurisdiction by the juvenile court 
over the children's parents by summons. 
In re State in Interest of Graham, 110 U. 
159, 170 P. 2d 172. 
Notice of hearing. 
Where mother had no notice or knowl-
edge of hearing before juvenile court, that 
court had no jurisdiction to determine her 
right to custody of child, but where she 
left it with others under such circum-
stances that it became a dependent and 
neglected child, the court thereby ob-
tained jurisdiction to determine who 
should temporarily have its custody. In re 
Bradley, 109 U. 538, 167 P. 2d 978. 
Where a summons was issued and serve-cl 
upon a juvenile and his parents notifying 
them that the juvenile was charged with 
violating the conditions of his probation 
and describing the charged violations, the 
summons provided adequate notice of the 
purpose of the hearing at which a previous 
probation was revoked, and it was not 
necessary that the notice expressly state 
that the hearing was to revoke the, proba-
tion. In Interest of Lindh, 11 U. (2cl) 385, 
359 P. 2d 1058. 
Notice to custodian of child. 
Uncler former statute (Comp. Laws 1917, 
§ 1818), service of notice, or voluntary ap-
pearance amounting to waiver, was neces-
sary to confer jurisdiction upon juvenile 
court for purpose of determining ancl ad-
judicating parent's or guarclian's right to 
custody of delinquent child; however, serv-
ice of such notice was not necessary to 
184 
JUVENILE COURTS 55-10-88 
confer jurisdiction upon juvenile court in 
order to determine and to adjudicate de-
linquency of child .• Jeusen v. Hinckley, 55 
U. 306, 185 P. 716. 
It was necessary that parent be given 
adequate notice of proceeding before juve-
nile court could require parent to support 
neglected child upon awarding custody to 
third person, so that, where father was not 
given notice that court would inquire into 
his present ability to support neglected 
child or to contribute something to latter's 
support, order requiring father to pay 
$30 per mo,nth for support of child, whose 
custody was awarded to maternal aunt 
and uncle by marriage, was invalid and 
was vacated on appeal. In re Olson, 111 
U. 365, 180 P. 2d 210. 
Voluntary appearance. 
Under former statute jurisdiction of a 
parent could be obtained Ly voluntary ap-
pearance. In re State in Interest of Gra-
ham, 110 U. 159, 170 P. 3d 172. 
Waiver of notice. 
Under former statute (Comp. Laws 1917, 
§ 1818), it was held that mother of minor 
son charged with delinquency, who had not 
been served with notice, did not waive 
such notice by being p1·esent in court as 
witness. Jensen v. tlinckley, 55 U. 306, 
185 P. 716. 
Notice could be waived by a parent in 
the same manner that a pa1·ty could waive 
notice in district court cases. ln re State 
in Interest of G1·aham, 110 U. 159, 170 P. 
2d 172. 
55-10-88. Service of summons and process-Notice to absent parent or 
guardian.-(1) Except as otherwise provided in this act, service of sum-
mons and process and proof of service shall be made in the manner provided 
in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(2) Service of summons or process shall be made by the sheriff of the 
county where the service is to be made, or by his deputy; but upon request 
of the court such service shall be made by any other peace officer, or by 
another suitable person selected by the court. 
(3) Service of summons in the state shall be made personally, by de-
livering a copy thereof to the person summoned; provided, however, that 
parents of a child living together at their usual place of abode may both 
be served by delivery personally to either parent of copies of the summons, 
one copy for each parent. If the judge makes a written finding that he 
has reason to believe that personal service of the summons will be unsuccess-
ful, or will not accomplish notification within a reasonable time after 
issuance of the summons, he may order service by registered mail, with a 
return receipt to be signed by the addressee only, to be addressed to the 
last known address of the person to be served in the state; service shall be 
complete upon return to the court of the signed receipt. 
( 4) If the parents, parent or guardian required to be summoned under 
section 55-10-87 cannot be found within the state, the fact of their child's 
presence within the state shall confer jurisdiction on the court in proceed-
ings in children's cases under this act as to any absent parent or guardian, 
provided that due notice has been given in the following manner: 
(a) If the address of the parent or guardian is known, by sending him 
a copy of the summons by registered mail with a return receipt to be signed 
by the addressee only, or by personal service outside the state, as provided 
in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Service by registered mail shall be 
complete upon retun1 to the court of the signed receipt. 
(b) If the address or whereabouts of the parent or guardian outside 
the state cannot after diligent inquiry be ascertained, by publishing a 
summons in a newspaper having general circulation in the county in which 
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the proceeding is pending. The summons shall be published once a week for 
four successive weeks. Service shall be complete on the day of the last 
publication. 
( c) Service of summons as provided in this subsection ( 4) shall vest the 
court with jurisdiction over the parent or guardian served in the same 
manner and to the same extent as if the person so served were served 
personally within the state. 
(5) In the case of service in the state, service completed not less than 
forty-eight hours before the time set in the summons for the appearance 
of the person served, shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction. In the case 
of service outside the state, service completed not less than five days before 
the time set in the summons for appearance of the person served, shall be 
sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 
(6) Computation of periods of time under this act shall be made in 
accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 26. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Persons to be served. 
Under former statute (Comp. Laws 
1917, § 1818), it was held that father as 
well as mother must be served where both 
parents were alive and resided within this 
state, and fact that mother accepted serv-
ice of notice did not confer jurisdiction 
on juvenile court to determine right of 
father to custody of his child. In re State 
in Interest of Bennett, 77 U. 247, 293 P. 
963. 
55-10-89. Failure to obey summons-Contempt-Warrant of arrest, 
when authorized-Appointment of guardian ad litem.-Any person sum-
moned as herein provided who without reasonable cause fails to appear, 
may be proceeded against for contempt of court, and the court may cause a 
bench warrant to issue to produce such person in court. 
If the summons cannot be served, or if it is made to appear to the court 
that the person served will not obey the summons, or that serving the 
summons will be ineffectual, or that the welfare of the child requires tha-t 
he be brought immediately into the custody of the court, a warrant may be 
issued for the parent, the guardian, the custodian, or the child. 
The court shall endeavor, through use of the warrant of arrest if neces-
sary, as provided in the preceding paragraph, or by other means, to ensure 
the presence at the hearing of one or both parents or of the guardian of 
the child. If none of them is present, the court may appoint a guardian 
ad litem to protect the interest of the child. A guardian ad litem may also 
be appointed whenever necessary for the welfare of the child, whether 
or not a parent or guardian is present. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 27. 
55-10-90. Child taken into custody by peace officer, private citizen or 
probation officer-Grounds-Notice requirements-Release or detention.-A 
child may be taken into custody by a peace officer without order of the 
court (a) when in the presence of the officer the child has violated a state 
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law, federal law or local law or municipal ordinance; (b) when there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that he has committed an act which if com-
mitted by an adult would be a felony; ( c) when he is seriously endangered 
in his surroundings, or when he seriously endangers others, and immediate 
removal appears to be necessary for his protection or the protection of 
others; (d) when there are reasonable grounds to believe that he has run 
away or escaped from his parents, guardian, or custodian. 
A private citizen or a probation officer may take a child into custody 
if the circumstances are such that he could make a citizen's arrest if an 
adult were involved. A probation officer may also take a child into custody 
under the circumstances set out in the preceding paragraph, or if the 
child has violated the conditions of probation, provided that the child is 
under the continuing jurisdiction of the juvenile court or in emergency 
situations in which a peace officer is not immediately available. 
When an officer or other person takes a child into custody, he shall 
without unnecessary delay notify the parents, guardian, or custodian. The 
child shall then be released to the care of his parent or other responsible 
adult unless his immediate welfare or the protection of the community re-
quires that he be detained. Before the child is released, the parent or other 
person to whom the child is released may be required to sign a written 
promise, on forms supplied by the court, to bring the child to the court at 
a time set or to be set by the court. 
A child shall not be detained by the police any longer than is reasonably 
necessary to obtain his name, age, residence and other necessary informa-
tion, and to contact his parents, guardian or custodian. If he is not there-
upon released as provided in the preceding paragraph, he must be taken to 
the court or to the place of detention or shelter designated by the court 
without unnecessary delay. 
The officer or other person who takes a child to a detention or shelter 
facility must notify the court at the earliest opportunity that the child has 
been taken into custody and where he was taken; he shall also promptly file 
with the court a brief written report stating the facts which appear to 
bring the child within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and giving the 
reason why the child was not released. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 28. Collateral References. 
Preliminary detention, 47 Am. Jur. 2d 
1013, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and 
Dependent Children § 35. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Arrest without warrant. 
There could be circumstances where a 
failure to take control of a child, resident 
or nonresident, might do the child an im-
mediate injustice, such as were contem-
plated by former section dealing with 
arrest without warrant. Under such cir-
cumstances the juvenile authorities were 
to act quickly and effectively. In re State 
in Interest of Johnson, 110 U. 500, 175 P. 
2d 486, in whieh it was held, however, 
that action of juvenile court, upon petition 
of the paternal grandmother, in taking 
child from the mother while enroute from 
Utah to California, the home of the mother 
and the child, was unwarranted. It was 
not an emergency case within the meaning 
of statute, but should have been tried in 
the orderly course of judicial proceedings. 
Accordingly, proceedings were dismissed, 
and the child discharged to custody of the 
mother. 
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Police officers had power to make ar-
rest without warrant for violation of 
curfew ordinance, and the arrest did not 
become unlawful because of a ten-minute 
delay in taking the minors for identifica-
tion before a family who had reported 
a prowler. A short detour made on the 
way to the station, necessary and prude,nt 
for the purposes of investigation, would 
not render unlawful the lawful arrest. 
Myers v. Collett, 1 U. (2d) 406, 268 P. 
2d 432. 
Informing parents of rights. 
Former section did not require police-
man to inform parents of a.rrested child 
of their custodial rights and the duty of 
the police to release the child to their 
custocly whe~ a written promise for his 
appearance m court was given by the 
parents. Myers v. Collett, 1 U. (2d) 406, 
268 P. 2d 432. 
Notice of arrest. 
Notice of arrest was to be given to the 
parents within a reasonable time in order 
to protect the rights of the pa.rents and 
afford oppo1-tunity for effectiveness of 
predecessor section. It was not mandatory 
for the police officers to inform the par-
ents before incarceration nor was it the 
duty of the police to inform the parents 
that the child could be released when a 
written promise for his appearance was 
given by the parents. Myers v. Collett, 1 
U. (2d) 406, 268 P. 2d 432. 
55-10-91. Placement of child in detention or shelter facility-Grounds-
Detention hearings-Period of detention-Confinement of children held for 
criminal proceedings-Bail laws inapplicable, exception.-(1) No child 
should be placed or kept in a detention or shelter facility pending court pro-
ceedings unless it is unsafe for the child or the public to leave him with his 
parents, guardian or custodian. A child who must be taken from his home 
but who does not require physical restriction shall be given temporary care 
in a shelter facility and shall not be placed in detention, as defined herein. 
When a child is placed in a detention or shelter facility, the person in 
charge of the facility shall immediately notify his parents, guardian or cus-
todian, and shall also promptly give notice to the court that the child is 
being held at the facility. 
After immediate investigation by a duly authorized officer of the court, 
the judge or such officer shall order the release of the child to his parents, 
guardian or custodian if it is found that he can be safely left in their 
care, either upon written promise to bring the child to the court at a time 
set, or without restriction; if i't is found that it is not safe to release the 
child, the judge or authorized officer may order that the child be held in the 
facility or be placed in another appropriate facility, subject to further order 
of the court. 
When a child is detained in a detention or shelter facility, the parents or 
guardian shall be informed by the person in charge of the facility that they 
have the right to a prompt hearing in court to determine whether the child 
is to be further detained or released. Detention hearings are to be held by 
the judge or by a referee. The court may at any time order the release of 
the child, whether a detention hearing is held or not. 
(2) No child shall be held in detention or shelter longer than forty-
eight hours, excluding Sundays and holidays, unless an order for continued 
detention or shelter has been made by the court. 
(3) No child under the age of sixteen may be confined in a jail, lockup 
or other place for adult de,tention. The provisions of section 55-10-49, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter 127, Laws of Utah 1961, relat-
ing to detention facilities for children, remain in full force and effect. A 
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child sixteen years of age or older whose conduct or condition endangers 
the safety or welfare of others in the detention facility for children may, on 
order of the court which shall specify the reasons therefor, be detained in 
another place of confinement considered appropriate by the court, including 
a jail or other place of confinement for adults. 
( 4) A child held for criminal proceedings pursuant to section 55-10-86 
may be detained in a jail or other place of detention used for adults charged 
with crime. 
(5) Provisions of law regarding bail shall not be applicable to children 
detained or taken into custody under this act, except tha,t bail may be 
allowed when a child who need not be detained lives outside this state. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 29. 
55-10-92. Child confine,d in jail or other adult facility-Official to notify 
juvenile court.-A sheriff, warden, or other official in charge of a jail or 
other facility for the detention of adult offenders or persons charged with 
crime, shall immediately notify the juvenile court when a child who is or 
appears to be under eighteen years of age is received at the facility, and 
shall make arrangements for the transfer of the child to a detention facility, 
unless otherwise ordered by the juvenile court; provided that this shall not 
apply to a child who i,s brought to the adult facility under order of the 
juvenile court to be heid for criminal proceedings, in the district court un-
der section 55-10-86. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 30. 
Traffic violations. 
City court had jurisdiction to try and 
sentence minor to jail for drunk driving 
in violation of city ordinance even though 
place of detention was not one exclusively 
for juveniles. Nelson v. Green, 25 U. (2d) 
319, 479 P. 2d 480, following Dimmitt v. 
City Court of Salt Lake City, 21 U. (2d) 
257, 444 P. 2d 461 (also involving traffic 
violations) in which two justices held 
city court had concurrent jurisdiction with 
juvenile court, one concurring justice 
thought city court had exclusive juris-
diction, one dissenting justice thought 
juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction 
and remaining justice neither concurred 
nor dissented, saying "this case rep1·esents 
no case law." 
55-10-93. Failure of parent or custodian to appear a.nd bring child to 
court-Warrant issued-Penalty.-If a parent or other person who signed 
a written promise to appear and bring the child to court under sections 
55-10-90 or 55-10-91, fails to appear and bring the child to• court on the date 
set in the promise, or, if the date was to be set, after notification by the 
court, a warrant may be issued for the apprehension of that person or the 
child, or both. 
Willful failure to perform such promise shall constitute a misdemeanor 
punishable as such, if at the time of the execution of the promise the prom-
isor is given a copy of such promise which clearly states that failure to· ap-
pear and have the child appear as promised is punishable as a misdemeanor. 
The juvenile court shall have jurisdiction to proceed against such promisor 
in adult proceedings pursuant to section 55-10-81. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 31. 
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55-10-94. Hearings-Conduct of-Public excluded, exceptions.-Hear-
ings in children's cases shall be held before the court without a jury and 
may be conducted in an informal manner. The general public shall be ex-
cluded and only such persons admitted, including persons whom the parents 
wish to be p-resent, as have a direct interest in the case or in the, work of the 
court; provided, however, that whenever the hearing is had on a written pe-
tition charging what would be a felony if committed by an adult, persons 
having a legitimate interest in the proceeding, including responsible repre-
sentatives of public information media, may be admitted by the judge. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 32, 
Collateral References. 
Infan tS"<:€=68. 
43 C.J.S. Infants § 96. 
Hearings, 47 Am. Jur. 2d 1021-1023, 
Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and De-
pendent Children §§ 44-48. 
Applicability of rule-s of evidence to 
juvenile delinquency proceeding, 43 A. L. 
R. 2d 1128. 
Power of juvenile court to require chil-
dren to testify, 151 A. L. R. 1229·. 
Right to jury trial in juvenile court 
delinquency proceedings, 100 A. L. R. 2d 
1241. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Presence of delinquent. 
While statute gave court power to hear 
evidence in absence of delinquent, and, no 
doubt, in many instances it might be 
necessary to do so, yet it was better, at 
least in case of children over ten years of 
age, to permit them to be present and to 
be heard in their own defense respecting 
their custody, conduct and control. Stoker 
v. Gowans, 45 U. 556, 147 P. 911, Ann. 
Oas. 1916E, 102'5. 
55-10-95. Children's cases heard separately from adult cases-Child or 
parents or custodian heard separately-Continuance of hearing.-Children's 
cases shall be heard separately from adult cases under section 55-10-80. The 
child or his parents or custodian may be heard separately when this is 
deemed neces•sary by the court. The hearing may be continued from time to 
time to a date specified by court order. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 33. 
55-10-96. Hearings-Record of proceedings-Right of parties to counsel 
-County attorney to represent stat~Special rules for violations of motor 
vehicle laws, fish and game laws and boating laws-Admissibility of special 
reports on child.-A verbatim record of the proceedings shall be taken, by 
a court ,stenographer or by means of a mechanical recording device, in all 
cases which might result in deprivation of custody, as defined herein. In all 
other cases a verbatim record shall also be made, unless dispensed with by 
the court. 
Parents, guardians, the child's custodian, and the child, if old enough, 
shall be informed that they have the right to be represented by counsel at 
every stage of the proceedings. They have the right to emp'1oy counsel of 
their own choice; and if any of them requests an attorney and is found by 
the court to be without sufficient financial means to employ an attorney, 
counsel shall be appointed by the court. The court may appoint counsel 
without such request if it deems representation by counsel necessary to pro-
tect the interest of the child or of other parties. If the child and other par-
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ties were not represented by counsel, the court shall inform them at the 
conclusion of the proceedings that they have the right to appeal. 
The county attorney shall represent the state in any proceedings in a 
children's case. 
The board may adopt special rules of procedure to govern proceedings 
involving violations of traffic laws or ordinances, and violations of fish and 
game laws and boating laws. 
For the purpose of determining proper disposition of the child, and for 
the purpose of establishing the fact of neglect or dependency, written re-
ports and other material relating to the child's mental, physical and social 
history and condition, may be received in evidence, and may be considered 
by the court along with o-ther evidence, but the court may require that the 
person who wrote t'he report or prepared the material appear as a witness if 
he is reasonably available. 
History: L. 1966, ch. 166, § 34; 1971, ch. 
134, § 4. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1971 amendment deleted "Upon the 
request of the court" from the beginning 
and "in the interest of the child" follow• 
ing "represent the state" in the third 
paragraph relating to the county attorney. 
Cross-Reference. 
County attorney to represent child 
charged with delinquency, and to prose-
cute adults contributing to delinquency, 
17-18-1. 
Evidence. 
Notwithstanding provisions o.f this sec-
tion and 55-10-99, relating to special re-
ports, in action to determine competency 
of mother to care for her children, use by 
juvenile court of "social file" which had 
not been introduced in evidence was denial 
of due process of law since mother had 
no opportunity to know, cross-examine, 
explain or rebut such secret evidence. 
State ex rel. Pilling v. Lance, 23 U. (2d) 
407, 464 P. 2d 395. 
Collateral References. 
Applicability of rules of evidence in 
juvenile delinquency proceedings, 43 A. 
L. R. 2d 1128. 
Power of juvenile court to require chil-
dren to testify, 151 A. L. R. 1229. 
55-10-97. Consolidation of p,roceedings involving more than one child.-
When more than one child is involved in a home situation which may be 
found to constitute neglect or dependency, or when more than one child is 
alleged to be involved in the same law violation, the proceedings may be 
consolidated, except that separate hearings may be held with respect to 
disposition. 
History: L. 1965, ch, 165, § 35, 
55-10-98. Amendment of petition-When authodzed-Continuance of 
proceedings.-When it appears during the course of any proceeding in a 
children's case that the evidence presented points to material facts not al-
leged in the petition, the court may proceed to consider forthwith the addi-
tional or different matters raised by the evidence, if the parties consent. In 
such event the court on motion of any interested party or on its own motion, 
shall direct tha,t the petition be amended to conform to the evidence. If the 
amendment results in a substantial departure from the facts· originally al-
leged, the court shall grant such continuance as justice may require. 
History: L. 1966, ch. 165, § 36. 
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55-10-99. Social study and report required in children's cases-Excep-
ti()(tlS.-The probation department or other agency designated by the court 
shall make a social study and report in writing in all children.'s cases in 
which a petition has been filed, except that the court may dispense with such 
study and report in cases involving violations of traffic laws or ordinances, 
violations of fish and game laws, boating laws, and other minor cases. 
Where the allegations of a petition filed under section 55-10-77 subsection 
(1) are denied, the investigation shall not be made until the court has made 
an adjudication, as defined herein. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 37. 
Evidence. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of 55-
10-96 and this section, relating to special 
reports, in an action to determine com-
petency of mother to care for her children, 
use by juvenile court of "social file" which 
had not been introduced in evidence was 
denial of due process of law since mother 
had no opportunity to know, cross-examine, 
explain or rebut such secret evidence. 
State ex rel. Pilling v. Lance, 23 U. (2d) 
407, 464 P. 2d 395. 
55-10-100. Adjudication of jurisdiction of juvenile court-Disposition 
of cases-Enumeration of possible court orders-Considerations of court.-
When a child is found to come within the provisions of sec,tion 55-10-77, the 
court shall so adjudicate, and make a finding of the fact,s upon which it 
bases its jurisdiction over the child. Upon such adjudication, the court may 
make the following dispositions by court order: 
(1) The court may place the child on probation or under protective 
supervision (as these terms are defined herein) in his own home, upon 
conditions determined by the court; 
(2) The court may place the child in the legal custody of a relative or 
other suitable person, with or without probation or protective supervision, 
provided that the juvenile court shall not assume the function of developing 
foster home services. 
(3) The court may vest legal cuS'tody of the child in the state depart-
ment of public welfare or other public agency, department, or institution, or 
in a child placement agency as defined herein, for placement in a foster fam-
ily home or other facility, not including the state industrial school or any 
similar institution, and not including the state hospital or the state train-
ing school or any similar institution. 
( 4) The court may commit the child to the state industrial school or 
other similar institution that may be available, provided that in the· event 
that a youth correction agency is established for this state, the child be 
committed to the youth correction agency rather than the state industrial 
school or similar institution. But a child who is found to come under the 
jurisdiction of the court solely on the ground of neglect or dependency pur-
suant to section 55-10-77 (2) (a) may not be committed to the state indus-
trial school or any similar institution wi,thin or without this sfate, nor to 
the state youth correction agency. 
(5) The court may commit the child to an institution or facility for 
short-term confinement that may be established in accordance with accepted 
standards for the care and treatment of delinquent children. 
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(6) The court may place the child on a ranch, forestry camp, or similar 
facility, for care and for work if possible, provided that the person, agency, 
or association operating the facility has been approved or has otherwise 
complied with all applicable state and local laws. A child placed in a forestry 
camp or similar facility may be required to work on fire prevention, foresta-
tion and reforestation, recreational works, forest roads, and on other works 
on or off the grounds of such facility, and may be paid wages, all subject 
to the approval of and under conditions set by the court. 
(7) The court may order that the child be required to repair or replace 
or to otherwise make restitution for damage or loss caused by his wrongful 
act, and may impose fines in limited amounts. 
(8) The court may through its probation department encourage the de-
velopment of employment or work programs, to enable children to fulfill 
their obligations under the preceding paragraph of this section, and for 
other purposes when deemed desirable by the court. 
(9) In cases of violations of traffic laws or ordinances, the court may, 
in addition to any other disposition, restrain the child from driving for such 
periods of time as the court deems necessary, and may take possession of 
the child's driver's license. 
(10) The court may order that the child be examined or treated by a 
physician, surgeon, psychiatrist, or psychologist, or that he receive other 
special care, and for such purposes may place the child in a hospital or 
other suitable facility. 
(11) The court may appoint a guardian for the child where it appears 
necessary to do so in the interest of tbe child, and may appoint a public or 
private institution or agency in which legal custody of the child is vested, 
as such guardian. 
(12) In placing a child under the guardianship or legal custody of an 
individual or of a private agency or institution, the court shall give primary 
consideration to the welfare of the child, but whenever practicable, may 
take into consideration the religious preferences of the child and of his 
parents. 
(13) In support of a decree under section 55-10-77 the court may make 
an order setting forth reasonable conditions to be complied with by the par-
ents, the child, his custodian, or any other person who has been made a 
party to the proceedings, including, but not limited to, restrictions on visi-
tation by the parents or one parent, restrictions on the child's associates, 
occupation, and other activities, and requirements to be observed by the 
parents or custodian. 
(14) With respect to a child within the court's jurisdiction under sec-
tion 55-10-77, the court may order hospitalization in the Utah state hospital 
if the court finds, upon due notice to the parents or guardian and a special 
hearing conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 64-7-36, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, that the child is (1) mentally ill, and (2) because [ of] 
his illness is likely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty, 
or is in need of custody, care or treatment in a mental hospital. The proce-
dure applicable in the district courts with respect to judicial proceedings 
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for hospitalization in the Utah state hospital shall be followed by the juve-
nile court in such cases. 
(15) The court may make an order committing a child within its juris-
diction to the Utah state training school if the child has been found re-
tarded or mentally deficient in accordance with the provisions of sections 
64-8-16 to 64-8-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953. The procedure applicable in 
the district courts with respect to judicial commitments to the Utah state 
training school shall be followed by the juvenile court in such cases. 
(16) The court may terminate all parental rights, provided that the 
provisions of section 55-10-109 are complied with. 
(17) The court may make any other reasonable orders which are for 
the best interest of the child or are required for the protection of the public, 
except that no child may be committed to jail or prison upon adjudication 
under this act. The court may combine several of the above-listed modes of 
disposition where they are compatible. 
(18) Before depriving any parent of the custody of his or her child, the 
court shall give due consideration to the preferred right of parents to the 
custody of their children, as expressed in section 55-10-63, and shall not 
transfer custody to another person, agency, or institution, unless the court 
finds from all the circumstances in the case that the welfare of the child or 
the public interest requires that the child be taken from his home. 
(19) An order under this section for probation or placement of a child 
with an individual or an agency shall include a date certain for a review of 
the case by the court, with a new date to be set upon each review. In re-
viewing foster home placements, special attention shall be given to making 
adoptable children available for adoption without delay. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 38. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The bracketed word "of" in subd. (14) 
was inserted by the compiler. 
Preference of natural parents. 
Juvenile court did not abuse its discre-
tion in refusing to grant custody of 
brother and sister to an aunt and uncle 
who were well qualified to care for the 
children and intended to adopt them and 
who had affidavit of natural mother that 
she preferred the children be placed with 
the aunt, where it appeared that due to 
past emotional disturbances the children 
were very jealous of one another and 
were showing more healthy development 
in separate homes, and that if the children 
were placed with their aunt, the mother 
would soon attempt to interfere with their 
guardians. In re Cooper, 17 U. (2d) 296, 
410 P. 2d 475. 
Collateral References. 
Infants~69. 
43 C.J.S. Infants §§ 96-102. 
Findings, orders and judgment, 47 Am. 
Jur. 2d 1028-1031, Juvenile Courts and 
Delinquent and Dependent Children §§ 55-
59. 
What constitutes delinquency or incor-
rigibility justifying commitment of in-
fant, 45 A. L. R. 1533, 85 A. L. R. 1099. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Award of custody to third person. 
Juvenile court had authority to award 
custody of child to maternal aunt and 
unele by marriage under supervision of 
county welfare department where ehild 
was neglected by father and its mother 
was dead, as against contention that 
neither juvenile court nor county welfare 
department was licensed child-placement 
agency, as statutes relating to placement 
of children for ultimate purpose of adop-
tion were inapplicable. In re Olson, 111 
U. 365, 180 P. 2d 210. 
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Custody of twelve-year-old girl who had 
been living with maternal grandparents 
for eight years following death of mother, 
and whose father had neglected to support 
or provide for her welfare was properly 
awarded to maternal aunt and uncle by 
marriage who came to live at home of 
girl's grandparents following death of her 
grandmother, subject to supervision by 
county welfare department, rather than 
to father, pursuant to girl's choice, even 
though county welfare department had 
been extending financial assistance, where 
evidence established that aunt and uncle 
were financially able to provide proper 
care and training for girl. In re Olson, 111 
U. 365, 180 P. 2d 210. 
Custody of neglected child. 
Finding that children were neglected 
did not necessarily require that parents 
be deprived of custody. In re State in 
Interest of Black, 3 U. (2d) 315, 283 P. 
2d 887, cert. den. 350 U. S. 923, 76 S. Ct. 
211. 
Parents who taught, preached, and 
practiced the law of plural marriage were 
properly deprived of custody of their chil-
dren on grounds of neglect. In re State in 
Interest of Black, 3 U. (2d) 315, 283 P. 
2d 887, cert. den. 350 U. S. 923, 76 S. Ct. 
211, distinguished in 7 U. (2d) 413, 326 
P. 2d 707. 
Determination of custody generally. 
Ultimate concern of juvenile courts in 
determining custody of child was what 
was for the best interoots of the child. In 
re Olson, 111 U. 365, 180 P. 2d 210; Briggs 
v. Briggs, 111 U. 4181 181 P. 2d 223. 
In determining custody of child over 
ten years of age, juvenile court could in-
quire of child and take into consideration 
child's desires regarding future custody. 
In re Olson, 111 U. 365, 180 P. 2cl 2,10, cit-
ing Anderson v. Anderson, 110 U. 300, 172 
P. 2d 132. 
Wishes of child, as opposed to legal 
rights of parent, were particularly per-
suasive in determining custody by juvenile 
court, where parent had voluntarily for 
long period of time allowed child to re-
main with- third person. In re Olson, 111 
U. 365, 180 P. 2d 210. 
In determining custody of neglected 
child, juvenile court could inquire into 
father's habits and conduct to ascertain 
their possible effect upon welfare of child, 
as well as to form judgment as to reason-
ableness of choice expressed by child. In 
re Olson, 111 U. 365, 180 P. 2d 210. 
More important than the rights and 
privileges of the parents was the welfare 
of the children and their prospects for be-
coming well-adjusted, self-sustaining· in-
dividuals. State in Inte,rest of F-, D-
& P- v. Dade, 14 U. (2d) 47, 376 P. 2d 
948. 
It was generally for the best interest 
and welfare of children to be reared under 
the care of their natural parents; the cut-
ting of family ties was a step of the ut-
most gravity to be done only for the 
most compelling reasons. State in Interest 
of F--, D- & P- v. Dade, 14 U. (2d) 
47, 376 P. 2d 948. 
The drastic remedy of depriving parents 
of custody of children in cases where there 
was delinquency, dependency, or neglect 
was to be resorted to only in extreme 
cases and when it was manifest that the 
home itself could not or would not correct 
the evils which existed. State in Interest 
of F-, D- & P- v. Dade, 14 U. (2d) 
47, 376 P. 2d 948. 
Discretion in awarding custody. 
If parents knew of child's delinquency 
and were unable to control such child and 
prevent him from further wrongdoing, 
then the interests of the child, its par-
ents and of society might demand that 
the parents surrender custody of their 
child to the state-. In re State in Interest 
of Bennett, 77 U. 247, 293 P. 963. 
Nature and extent of court's jurisdiction. 
Former act practically conferred pa.-
rental powers and duties upon the juve-
nile court, and though its procedure in 
providing for custody and control of the 
delinquent might be somewhat irregular, 
its orders were not, for that reason, void. 
Stoker v. Gowans, 45 U. 556, 147 P. 911, 
Ann. Cas. 1916E, 1025. 
When court found child to be dependent 
and neglected, it was required, under 
predecessor section, to place it under such 
custody as was for its best interests, giv-
ing due consideration to the preference of 
the parents. In re Bradley, 109 U. 538, 
167 P. 2d 978. 
The fact that custody of a child was 
awarded to other than the mother did 
not forever bar her from obtaining custody 
of her baby, since the child remained a 
ward of the juvenile cotu-t, and custody 
of the child could be changed when justi-
fied by the surrounding facts and circum-
stances. In re Bradley, 109 U. 538, 167 P. 
2d 978. 
Fact that third person might be provid-
ing care for child by reason of neglect 
of parent did not deprive juvenile court 
of jurisdiction to inquire into welfare of 
such child and to fix responsibility antl 
determine p1·oper custody for child with-
in scope of statutory authority granted 
to court. In re Olson, 111 U. 365, 180 P. 
2d 2,10. 
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Where father of child, which had been 
living with maternal grandparents since 
death of mother, did not traverse allega-
tions of petition that he had neglected to 
suppol't child for eight years, and did not 
file application for custody, juvenile court 
had authority to determine custody upon 
establishment of alleged neglect and to fix 
responsibility for such custody. In re Ol-
son, 111 U. 365, 180 P. 2d 210. 
Preferential rights of parent. 
P1·edecessor section recognized the 
preferential right of the parent to custody 
of child until adjudicated otherwise; the 
Juvenile Code gave repeated warnings 
of that preferential right and emergency 
provisions, such as statutes dealing with 
arrest of juvenile without warrant and 
search and seizure, were not intended as 
a convenient vehicle for nullifying that 
preference. In l'e State in Interest of 
Johnson, 110 U. 500, 175 P. 2d 486. 
Even though district coUl't in divorce 
proceedings had found that a father had 
not been shown to be a pl'Oper person 
and had been convicted of a felony in 
a military court, it was an abuse of dis-
cretion for the juvenile court to, deprive 
him of custody of his children where he 
produced evidence that the children would 
be well cared for and where there was a 
recommendation by a child welfare repre-
sentative that an opportunity for further 
investigation be afforded. Fronk v. State, 
7 U. (2d) 245, 322 P. 2d 397. 
Sufficiency of judgment or decree. 
Under Comp. Laws 1917, § 1822, the 
facts constituting the delinquency of the 
child had to be stated separately and dis-
tinctly; mel'e conclusions we1·e insufficient. 
State v. Butcher, 74 U. 275, 279 P. 497. 
For reasons that the legislature evi-
dently deemed proper, § 1822, Comp. Laws 
1917, did not provide for a judgment or 
decree that the parent or other custodian 
was or was not "fit" or "unfit." In re State 
in Interest of Bennett, 77 U. 247, 293 P. 
963, applying Comp,. Laws 1917, § 1823, 
as amended by Laws 1919. 
Validity of judgment. 
Conclusions of Supreme Court that the 
pl'ovisions of 55-10-1 and 55-10-3 delegat-
ing to the public welfare collllllission gen-
el'al control and supervision over juvenile 
courts offended Art. V, § 1 and Art. VIII, 
§ 11, Utah Constitution did not affect 
validity of juvenile court judgment com-
mitting a minor to the industrial school 
conditionally where the judgment was sup-
pol'ted by sufficient evidence, there being 
no constitutional objection to the balance 
of the language of each section which 
was separable. In re ·woodward, 14 U. 
(2d) 336, 384 P. 2d 110. 
55-10-101. Continuing jurisdiction of juvenile court-Period of and 
termination of jurisdiction-Notice of discharge from state hospital or 
training school.-Jurisdiction obtained by the court of a child through 
adjudication under section 55-10-100 shall continue for purposes of this 
act until he becomes twenty-one years of age, unless terminated prior 
thereto. 
The continuing jurisdiction of the court shall terminate (1) upon order 
of the court, (2) upon commitment to the state industrial school, and (3) 
upon commencement of proceedings in adult cases under section 55-10-80. 
The continuing jurisdiction of the court is not terminated by marriage. 
When a child has been committed by the court to the Utah state 
hospital or the Utah state training school, the superintendent of the in-
stitution shall give the court written notice of its intention to discharge, 
release, or parole the child not later than five days prior to his discharge, 
release, or parole. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 39; 19'71, 
ch. 134, § 5. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1971 amendment added the provi-
sion for notice to the court of the dis-
charge of a child from the state hospital 
or training school. 
55-10-102. Transfer of continuing jurisdiction to other district.-Juris-
diction over a child on probation or under protective supervision, or of a 
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child who is otherwise under the continuing jurisdiction of the court, may 
be transferred by the court to the court of another district, if the receiving 
court consents, or upon direction of the presiding judge. Thereupon the re-
ceiving court shall have the same powers with respect to the child that it 
would have had if the proceedings had originated in that court. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 40. 
55-10-103. Period of operation of judgment, decree or order-Rights 
and responsibilities of agency or individual granted legal custody.-No 
judgment, order or decree of the juvenile court shall operate after the 
child becomes twenty-one years of age, except orders of commitment or 
hospitalization to the state training school or state hospital. 
A.n order vesting legal custody of a child in an individual, agency, or 
institution shall be for an indeterminate period, but shall not remain in 
force longer than two years from the date it is entered; provided, however, 
that the individual, agency, or institution involved may file a petition for 
renewal of the order, and the court may, after notice and hearing, renew 
the order if it finds renewal necessary to safeguard the welfare of the child 
or the public interest. The findings of the court and the reasons therefor 
shall be entered with the renewal order or with the order denying renewal. 
The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to the state industrial 
school, the state hospital or the state training school. 
An agency granted legal custody shall have the right to determine where 
and with whom the child shall live, provided that placement of the child 
does not remove him from the :state without court approval. An individual 
granted legal custody shall personally exercise the rights and responsibili-
ties involved in legal custody, unless otherwise, authorized by the court. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 41. 
55-10-104. Exchange of information with agency or institution having 
legal custody-Transfer of child to state prison or other adult facility pro-
hibited.-Whenever legal custody of a child is vested in an institution or 
agency, the court shall transmit with the court order copies of the social 
study, any cliniC"al reports, and other information pertinent to the care and 
treatment of the child. The institution or agency shall give the court any 
information concerning the child that the court may at any time require. 
The state industrial school or any other institution or agency to whom 
a child is committed under section 55-10-100 shall not transfer custody of 
the child to the state prison or any other institution for the correction of 
adult offenders. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 42. 
55-10-105. Children's cases deemed civil proceedings-Adjudication of 
jurisdiction by juvenile court not conviction of crime, exception-Record 
and evidence inadmissible in other proceedings, exception~Child not to be 
charged with crime, exception-Traffic violation cases, abstracts to depart-
ment of public safety.-(1) Proceedings in children's cases shall be re-
garded as civil proceedings, with the court exercising equitable powers. 
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(2) An adjudication by a juvenile court that a child is within its juris-
diction under section 55-10-77 shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime, 
except in cases involving traffic violations; no such adjudication shall oper-
ate to impose any civil disabilities upon the child nor to disqualify the child 
for any civil service or military service or appointment. 
(3) Neither the record in the juvenile court nor any evidence given in 
the juvenile court shall be admissible as evidence against the child in any 
proceedings in any other court, with the exception of cases involving traffic 
violations. 
( 4) No child shall be charged with crime nor be convicted in any court 
except as provided in section 55-10-86 and in cases involving traffic viola-
tions. When a petition has been filed in the juvenile court, the child shall 
not thereafter be subjected to criminal prosecution based on the same facts 
except as provided in section 55-10-86. 
(5) Abstracts of court records for all adjudications of traffic violations 
shall be submitted to the department of public safety as provided in section 
41-2-17, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter 84, Laws of 
Utah 1961. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 43. 
Traffic violations. 
City courts have coucurrent jurisdiction 
with juvenile court in cases where chil-
dren less than eighteen years old are 
charged with traffic violations, such cases 
being an exception to general rule of 
Juvenile Act that juvenile court shall have 
exclusive original jurisdiction in proceed-
ings concerning any child who has vio-
lated any federal, state or local law or 
municipal ordinance. Dimmitt v. City 
Court of Salt Lake City, 21 U. (2d) 257, 
444 P. 2d 461. 
Collateral References. 
Constitutionality, construction, and ap-
plication of statutory provision against 
use in evidence in any other case of rec-
ords or evidence in juvenile court proceed-
ings, 147 A. L. R. 443. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Privileges and protection of minor. 
Ou petition for writ of habeas corpus 
where it appeared that petitioner was 
adjudged in contempt of court for failing 
to answer question whether defendant, in 
prosecution for having carnal knowledge 
of petitioner, had had sexual intercourse 
with petitioner on dates other than date 
of the offense being tried, objection on 
grounds of relevancy to the question 
should have been sustained and petition-
ei·'s plea of privilege should have been 
allowed, for although petitioner was a 
minor, she would have subjected herself 
to degradation had she testified in the 
affirmative, and although she was below 
the age to consent to the charge against 
the defendant, she was susceptible of be-
ing proceeded against in the juvenile 
court. In re Sadleir, 97 U. 291, 85 P. 2d 
810, affd. 97 U. 313, 94 P. 2d 161. 
55-10-106. Modification of order or decree-Requirements for changing 
or terminating custody, probation or protective supervision.-The court may 
modify or set aside any order or decree made by it; but no modification of 
an order placing a child on probation shall be made upon an alleged viola-
tion of the terms of probation, until there has been a hearing after due no-
tice to all persons concerned. Notice and a hearing shall also be required in 
any other case in which the effect of modifying or setting aside an order 
may be to deprive a parent of the legal custody of the child, or to make any 
other change in legal custody. 
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Notice of an order terminating probation or protective supervision shall 
be given to the parents, guardian, custodian, and, where appropriate, to the 
child. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 44. Collateral References. 
Modification of orders, 47 Am. Jur. 2d 
1030, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and 
Dependent Children § 57. 
55-10-107. New hearings authorized-Grounds and procedure.-A par-
ent, guardian, custodian, or next friend of any child adjudicated under this 
act, or any adult affected by a decree in a children's proceeding under this 
act, may at any time petition the court for a new hearing on the ground 
that new evidence which was not known and could not with due diligence 
have been made available at the original hearing and which might affect 
the decree, has been discovered. If it appears to the court that there is 
such new evidence which might affect its decree, it shall order a new hear-
ing and enter such decree and make such disposition of the case as is 
warranted by all the facts and circumstances and the best interest of 
the child. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 45. 
55-10-108. Modification or termination of custody order or decree-
Grounds-Procedure.-A parent, guardian, or next friend of a child whose 
legal custody has been transferred by the court to an individual, agency, 
or institution, except' the state industrial school, may petition the court for 
restoration of custody or other modification or revocation of the decree, on 
the ground that a change of circumstances has occurred which requires such 
modification or revocation in the best interest of the child or the public. The 
court shall make a preliminary investigation, and may dismiss the petition 
if it finds that the alleged change of circumstances, if proved, would not 
affect the decree. If the court finds that a further examination of the facts 
should be had, or if the court on its own motion determines that the decree 
should be reviewed, it shall conduct a hearing upon due notice to all persons 
concerned, and may thereupon enter an order continuing, modifying, or 
terminating the decree. 
No petition by a parent may be filed under this section after his or her 
parental rights have been terminated in accordance with section 55-10-109. 
An individual, agency, or institution vested with legal custody of a child 
may petition the court for a modification of the custody order on the ground 
that such change is necessary for the welfare of the child or in the public 
interest. The court shall proceed upon such petition in the same manner as 
upon a petition filed under the first paragraph of this section. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 46. 
Requirements for modification. 
Petition of father for custody of son, 
previously awarded to foster parents, came 
within purview of this statute requiring 
that change of circumstances be shown to 
justify modification of prior award whic.h 
should be based upon best interest of 
the child or public. In re State in Interest 
of Kelsey, 20 U. (2d) 131, 434 P. 2d 445. 
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DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Conditions for restoration of custody. 
Where there had been previous find-
ings of parent's unfitness to have cus-
tody of his minor daughter, it was not an 
abuse of discretion for court to require 
such parent to conduct himself "becom-
ingly" for a period of ten months before 
such custody would be given. State v. 
Sorensen, 102 U. 474, 132 P. 2d 132. 
Mental condition of parent. 
Where children had been placed in cus-
tody of state department of public wel-
fa1·e for purpose of adoption because of 
parents' mental condition, mother was not 
entitled to restoration of custody where 
she was unable to demonstrate any real 
understanding of what was necessary for 
the welfare of the children or how much 
money it would take or how it could be 
provided. State in Interest of F-, D-
& P- v. Dade, 14 U. (2d) 47, 376 P. 2d 
948. 
Modification of order. 
Judgment of juvenile court was subject 
to modification or suspension upon appli-
cation of delinquent or other interested 
party. Stoker v. Gowans, 45 U. 556, 147 
P. 911, Ann. Oas. 1916E, 1025. 
Where order of juvenile court had been 
made awarding custody of a minor child 
to a particular individual, such order 
would not thereafter be modified without 
a showing of a change of conditions or 
circumstances meriting such modification. 
State v. Sorensen, 102 U. 474, 132 P. 2d 
132. 
Nonresidents. 
"It seems inadvisable for this state to 
assume jurisdiction of the status of par-
ent and child of nonresidents except for 
the immediate and emergency purposes 
indicated. Jurisdiction once acquired re-
mains with the juvenile court until the 
minor becomes twenty-one (Sec. 14-7-30, 
U. C. A. 1943 and Ohatwin v. Terry, 107 
U. 340, 153 P. 2d 941), and may be modi-
fied from time to time as the circumstances 
justify. Yet to enforce orders against non-
residents would be almost an impossibil-
ity." In re State in Interest of Johnson, 
ll0 U. 500, 175 P. 2d 486. 
Notice. 
After original notice of petition had 
been given, no further notice need be 
given of application by probation officer 
or otherwise for a modification, suspen-
sion, or change of any order or judgment 
affecting the custody, control or conduct 
of a juvenile delinquent because child 
was constructively in custody of such 
court and failure to give further notice 
was not jurisdictional. It was better prac-
tice, however, to give notice of applica-
tion both to delinquent and to those who 
might be interested in his welfare. Stoker 
v. Gowans, 45 U. 556, 147 P. 911, Ann. 
Oas. 1916E, 1025. 
Right of parents to hearing. 
Where juvenile court had previously 
entered a proper order depriving parents 
of custody of their minor children and 
parents petitioned for restoration of cus-
tody on grounds of changed conditions, 
refusal of juvenile court to grant parents 
a hearing was an abuse of discretion. In 
re State in Interest of L. J. J., 11 U. (2d) 
393, 360 P. 2d 486. 
Welfare of children. 
More important than the rights and 
privileges of the parents was the welfare 
of the children and their prospects for be-
coming well-adjusted, self-sustaining in-
dividuals. State in Interest of F-, D- & 
P- v. Dade, 14 U. (2d) 47, 376 P. 2cl 948. 
55-10-109. Termination of parental rights-Grounds-Hearing-Effect 
of order-Placement of child-Voluntary petition of parent.-(1) The 
court may decree a termination of all parental rights with respect to one 
or both parents if the court finds : 
(a) That the parent or parents are unfit or incompetent by reason of 
conduct or condition seriously detrimental to the cllild; or 
(b) That the parent or parents have abandoned the child. It shall be 
prima facie evidence of abandonment that the parent or parents, although 
having legal custody of the child, have surrendered physical custody of the 
child, and for a period of six months following such surrender have not 
manifested to the child or to the person having tbe physical custody of the 
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child a firm intention to resume physical custody or to make arrangements 
for the care of the child ; or 
(c) That after a period of trial, during which the child was left in his 
own home under protective supervision or probation, or during which the 
child was returned to live in his own home, the parent or parents substan-
tially and continuously or repeatedly refused or failed to give the child 
proper parental care and protection. 
(2) A termination of parental rights may be ordered only after a hear-
ing is held specifically on the question of terminating the rights of the 
parent or parents. A verbatim record of the proceedings must be taken and 
the parties must be advised of their right to counsel. No such hearing 
shall be held earlier than ten days after service of summons is completed 
inside or outside of the state. The summons must contain a statement to 
the effect that the rights of the parent or parents are proposed to be 
permanently terminated in the proceedings. The statement may be made 
in the summons originally issued in the proceeding or in a separate sum-
mons subsequently issued. 
(3) Unless there is an appeal from the order terminating the rights of 
one or both parents, the order permanently terminates the legal parent-
child relationship and all the rights and duties, including residual parental 
rights and duties, of the parent or parents involved. 
( 4) Upon the entry of an order terminating the rights of the parent or 
parents, the court may (a) place the child in the legal custody and guardian-
ship of a child placement agency or the department of public welfare for 
purposes of adoption, or (b) make any other disposition of the child au-
thorized under section 55-10-100. All adoptable children shall be placed for 
adoption. 
(5) The parent-child relationship may be terminated upon voluntary 
petition of one or both parents if the court finds that such termination is in 
the best interests of the parent and the child. Such termination with respect 
to one parent does not affect the rights of the other parent. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 47. 
adoption matters. 
Juvenile court has no authority under 
statute to pass upon adoption matters and 
only matter court was authorized to de-
termine was whether parental rights 
should be terminated with respect to child. 
In re State in Interest of Kelsey, 20 U. 
(2d) 131, 434 P. 2d 445. 
Evidence sufficient to terminate parental 
rights. 
Decree of juvenile court permanently 
terminating all of mother's parental rights 
to twin boys was affirmed upon evidence 
that mother was emotionally unstable, 
that she failed to provide suitable environ-
ment for children, that she was unable to 
provide proper supervision and discipline 
for children and that children were ille-
gitimate and sired by an unknown father. 
In re State in Interest of Jennings, 20 U. 
(2d) 50, 432 P. 2d 879. 
In action to determine competency of 
mother to care for her children, evidence 
that, among other things, mother had 
failed over past two years to provide 
stable home for children and to provide 
dental care for two daughters, after being 
advised of need for such care, was in-
sufficient to support finding that mother 
was unfit or incompetent by reason of 
conduct or conditions "seriously detri-
mental" to children. State ex rel. Pilling 
v. Lanc.e, 23 U. (2d) 407, 464 P. 2d 395. 
Father's parental rights were properly 
terminated under subsec. (1) (a) of this 
section upon evidence that he murdered 
his wife in the presence of their two sm:i.11 
children and, in prison, remained emo-
tionally disturbed. In re State in Interest 
of Mullen, 29 U. (2d) 376, 510 P. 2d 531. 
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Father's right to custody of illegitimate 
child. 
Father who publicly acknowledged his 
paternity had right to custody of his 
illegitimate child, second only to mother's 
right, so that it was improper for juvenile 
court to dismiss petition for custody and 
thereby terminate father's parental right 
without hearing under this section to de-
termine whether he was fit and proper 
person. State in Interest of Baby Girl M, 
2,5 U. (2d) 101, 476 P. 2d 1013, 45 A. L. R. 
3d 206. 
Collateral References. 
Parent and Child~2. 
67 C.J.S. Parent and Child §§ 10-13. 
Loss or forfeiture of custody rights, 59 
Am. Jur. 2d 123-127, Parent and Child 
§§ 39, 40. 
Right of one in whose custody a child 
has been placed by society to retain cus-
tody as against society or privy, 80 A. 
L. R. 1129. 
Law Review. 
Proposals for Truce in the Holy War; 
Utah Adoption, Richard I. Aaron, 1970 
Utah L. Rev. 325. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Consent. 
An instrument surrendering right to 
custody of child could expre£sly provide 
that child might thereafter be adopted 
without consent of parent; the same was 
true of a court order awarding custody of 
child to a children's aid society for place-
ment for adoption; if court did order 
that child be placed for adoption by such 
a society and that consent of parents 
would not be necessary, the first condition 
provided for in 78-30-4 would be fully 
complied with since the parent would 
have been permanently deprived of cus-
tody. Deveraux v. Brown, 2 U. (2d) 334, 
273 P. 2d 185. 
Where parents had been permanently 
deprived of custody of a child on ac-
count of neglect, their parental rights 
had been terminated, and the child was 
placed for adoption, it was not necessary 
to notify or get the consent of the parents. 
Jacob v. State ex rel. Public Welfare 
Comm., 7 U. (2d) 304, 323 P. 2d 720. 
Effect of court decree. 
Any order or decree made by the juve-
nile court concerning the custody of a 
child would not have the effect of allowing 
such child to be adopted without the con-
sent of its surviving parents or parent, 
unless it appeared on the face of such 
order or decree that the court had fully 
considered that proposition and intended 
that such should be its effect. Deveraux v. 
Brown, 2 U. (2d) 334, 273 P. 2d 185. 
Power of the juvenile court. 
Former chapter gave the juvenile court 
authority permanently to deprive parents 
of the custody of children when circum-
stances made such action necessary. State 
in Interest of K- B-, 7 U. (2d) 398, 326 
P. 2d 395. 
Recommendation of welfare representative. 
It was an abuse of discretion for ju-
venile court permanently to deprive a 
father of custody of his children where 
there was evidence produced by the father 
that the children would be well cared for 
and also the recommendation of a child 
welfare representative that an opportunity 
for further investigation be afforded. 
Fronk v. State, 7 U. (2d) 245, 322 P. 2d 
397. 
Waiver of right to custody. 
A parent could, in pursuance of a writ-
ten instrument, duly executed by him or 
her, surrender and forfeit his or her right 
to the custody of his infant child. Stan-
ford v. Gray, 42 U. 228, 129 P. 423, Ann. 
Cas. 1916A, 989, distinguished in 44 U. 541, 
142 P. 716. 
55-10-110. Support and expenses of child in custody of individual or 
institution-Order for payment by parent or other person authorized-
Payment by division of family services.-(1) When legal custody of a 
child is vested by the court in an individual or agency other than his par-
ents or the state industrial school, the court may in the same or any subse-
quent proceeding inquire into the ability of the parents, a parent, or any 
other person who may be obligated, to support the child and to pay any 
other expenses of the child, including the expense of any medical, psychia-
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tric, or psychological examination or treatment provided under order of the 
court. The court may, after due notice and a hearing ou the matter, require 
the parents or other person to pay the whole or part of such support and 
expenses, depending on their financial resources and other demands on 
their funds. The amounts so required to be paid shall be paid at such inter-
vals as the court may direct, and unless otherwise ordered, payment is to 
be made to the clerk of the juvenile court for transmission to the person or 
agency having legal custody of the child or to whom compensation is due. 
The clerk of the court shall have authority to receive periodic payments to-
ward the care and maintenance of the child, such as social security pay-
ments or railroad retirement payments made in the name of or for the 
benefit of the child. 
No court order under this section against a parent or other person shall 
be entered, unless summons has been served within the state or a voluntary 
appearance is made or a waiver of service given. The summons shall specify 
that a hearing with respect to the financial support of the child will be held. 
(2) An order entered under this section against a parent or other per-
son may be enforced by contempt proceedings, and shall also have the effect 
of a judgment at law. In addition to other remedies, the court may issue an 
order to any employer, trustee, financial agency, or other person, firm, or 
corporation, indebted to the parents or either of them, or indebted to any 
other person ordered to make payment under this section, to withhold and 
pay over to the clerk of the court, moneys due or to become due not in ex-
cess of the lesser of the following: (a) the amount ordered to be paid by 
the court under this section, or (b) one-fourth of the amount due o,r becom-
ing due the parent or other person at each regular or usual payday or 
day of disbursement. 
No property of the parents, or either of them, shall be exempt from exe-
cution to enforce collection of the amounts ordered to be paid by the court 
under this section. 
Upon request of the court, the county attorney shall enforce orders of 
the court issued under subsection (1) of this section. 
(3) If the court finds that the parents are unable to pay for full or 
partial support, and other expenses of the child and that no other provision 
for the payment of such support and expenses has been made, or if the 
parents or other person obligated to pay under court order issued under 
this section have failed to make such payment, or if summons could not 
be served within the state upon the parents or other person under subsec-
tion (1) of this section, the division of family services shall be responsible 
for the payment of such support and other expenses for the neglected, 
dependent, or delinquent child involved pursuant to section 55-15-10, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended. To the extent that parents or other 
persons are obligated by court order to pay amounts expended by the 
division of family services under this section, such division may enforce 
reimbursement of funds so expended and the continuation of payments 
in the same manner as claims for support payments are enforced by the 
division of family services pursuant to sections 55-15-36 and 78-45-9. 
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( 4) Payment for child support may be made to a nongovernmental 
agency in whom the court vests legal custody, provided that the agency 
shall make periodic reports to the court concerning the care and treatment 
the child is receiving and his response to such treatment. Such reports shall 
be made at such intervals as the court may direct, and shall be made with 
respect to each child at least every six months. The agency shall also afford 
an opportunity for a representative of the court to visit the child as fre-
quently as the court deems necessary. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 48; 1969, 
ch. 197, § 92. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1969 amendment substituted refer-
ences to the division of family services 
for references to the state department of 
public welfare and department of publie 
welfare in subsec, (3). 
Sections 55-15-10 and 55-15-36, cited in 
sub sec. ( 3), were repealed by Laws 1973, 
ch. 122, § 29. 
55-10-111. Search warrants authorized in cases of detention or ill-treat-
ment of children.-If it appears to the court upon an affidavit sworn to by a 
peace officer or any other person, and upon the examination of other wit-
nesses if required by the judge, that there is probable cause to believe that 
a child is being detained or ill-treated in any place within the jurisdiction 
of the court, the court may issue a warrant authorizing a peace officer to 
search for the child. The officer making the search may enter a house or 
premises, if necessary by force, in order to remove the child. The officer 
must thereupon take the child to the court or to the place of detention 
or shelter designated by the court. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 49, Cross-Reference, 
Reporting physical abuse of minors, 
55-16-1 et seq. 
55-10-112. Appeal to Supreme Court from order, decree or judgment of 
juvenile court-Procedure.-An appeal to the Supreme Court may be taken 
from any order, decree, or judgment of the juvenile court. Such appeal shall 
be taken in the same manner in which appeals are taken from judgments 
or decrees of the district courts. The appeal must be taken within one month 
from the entry of the order, decree, or judgment appealed from. A typed 
transcript of the proceedings shall be made available to the parties in the 
same manner as in the district court. The juvenile court shall transmit any 
social study and report made in the case to the Supreme Court. The at-
torney general shall represent the state in all appeals under this act. 
Unless the juvenile court stays its order, the pendency of an appeal shall 
not stay the order or decree appealed from in a children's case, unless 
otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court, if suitable provision for the 
care and custody of the child involved is made pending the appeal. Where 
the order or decree appealed from directs a change of legal custody of 
a child, the appeal shall be heard and decided at the earliest practicable 
time. The name of the child shall not appear on the record on appeal. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 50. Appealability of psychological examination 
order, 
Appeal from order of juvenile court that 
mother of children allegedly neglected or 
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dependent submit to psychological exam-
ination was premature under the statute 
providing £or appeal to Supreme Court 
from any order of juvenile court, the stat-
ute being intended to apply only to final 
orders. In re State in Interest of Per-
singer, 19 U. (2d) 186, 429 P. 2d 37. 
Collateral References. 
In£ants¢::>69. 
43 C.J.S. Infants § 96. 
Review, 47 Am. Jur. 2d 1031, Juvenile 
Courts and Delinquent and Dependent 
Children § 60. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Appealable judgments, orders and decrees. 
Appeal would lie to Supreme Court from 
order of juvenile, court revoking order 
suspending sentence and committing de-
linquent to industrial school. Stoker v. 
Gowans, 45 U. 556, 147 P. 911, Ann. Cas. 
1916E, 1025. 
Once the juvenile court which had ex-
clusive original jurisdiction in matters in-
volving the dependency, neglect and/or 
delinquency of children, assumed jurisdic-
tion of children whose dependency, neglect 
or delinquency was in issue, the matters 
of (1) fitness of persons to have custo<l.y 
and (2) the welfare of the minors were 
matters appealable directly to the Supreme 
Court and not reviewable by the district 
court in habeas corpus proceedings. Black 
v. Anderson, 3 U. (2d) 42, 277 P. 2d 975, 
Effect of appeal. 
Since former statute provided that an 
appeal should not discharge a child from 
the custody of the juvenile court, the fact 
that petitioner had appealed from order 
of juvenile court, and that appeal was 
pending, undecided, before the Supreme 
Court, would not prevent him from apply-
ing to the juvenile court for custody of 
his child upon a showing of change of 
circumstances and compliance with the 
co11ditions which that court had prescribed 
as prerequisite to having the child re-
turned to him. Jensen v. Sevy, 103 U. 
220, 134 P. 2d 1081. 
Habeas corpus. 
Since orders of juvenile court were ap-
pealable to the Supreme Court, judgment 
of juvenile court could not be overturned 
by suing out a writ of habeas corpus and 
obtaining a hearing on the very same 
issue by that method either in the district 
or the Supreme Court. Jensen v. Sevy, 
103 U. 230, 134 P. 2d 1081. 
Judgment on appeal. 
Where, on appeal from order of juve-
nile court committing delinquent minor 
to state industrial school and finding that 
mother was unfit to have custody of her 
son, it appeared that second finding was 
not justified by evidence, minor would 
be released from state industrial school 
and be restored to legal custody and con-
trol of juvenile court, but in actual cus-
tody of his mother, in whose custody he 
s,hould remain until there was evidence 
that she was unfit pe,rson to have custody 
of minor. Bedford v. Anderson, 56 U. 287, 
190 P. 775. 
Scope of review. 
Where appeal was from order of juve-
nile court dismissing parent's petition and 
motion which attacked the jurisdiction of 
court in depriving petitioner of custody of 
his two children, and not from judgment 
on the merits, the only questions properly 
before the Supreme Court were those 
which pertained to the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court. In re State in Interest of 
Graham, 110 U. 159, 170 P. 2d 172. 
Hearings in juvenile court as to cus-
tody of children were equitable, and the 
Supreme Court was responsible £or review-
ing the evidence; findings would not be 
disturbed unless they were clearly against 
the weight of the evidence, or the court 
had abused its discretion. State in Inter-
est of K- B-, 7 U. (2d) 398, 326 P. 2d 
395. 
55-10-113. Violation of order of court-Contempt-Penalty.-Any per-
son who willfully violates or refuses to obey any order of the court, may be 
proceeded against for contempt of court. Any person over eighteen years of 
age found in contempt of court may be punished by a fine not to exceed 
$200, or by imprisonment not to exceed thirty days, or by both such fine 
and imprisonment. 
History: L. 1965, ch, 165, § 51. Collateral References. 
Interference with enforcement of judg-
ment in criminal or juvenile delinquent 
case as contempt, 8 A. L. R. 3d 657. 
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55-10-114. Courtrooms, office space and equipment-Maintenance costs 
of juvenile court.-Suitable courtrooms shall be provided by the board for 
the hearing of cases, and office space, equipment, and supplies for the use 
of the judges, officers, and employees of the court. The cost of maintaining 
the juvenile courts shall be paid from the general fund of the state or 
other funds available to the board for such purposes. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 52. 
55-10-115. Fines, penalties and forfeitures paid to county treasurer-
Fees-Sheriff to maintain order and provide transportation.-Except as 
otherwise provided by law, all fines, penalties, and forfeitures imposed and 
collected by the juvenile court shall be paid to the county treasurer of the 
county in which they are collected. 
There shall be no fee for filing a petition under this act, nor shall any 
fees be charged by any state or local public officer for the service or process 
or for attendance in court in any such proceedings. Witness fees shall be 
payable to persons summoned or required to appear. Travel expenses shall 
be payable in accordance with section 55-10-87 (7). Such fees and expenses, 
the cost of publication of summons, and the expense of a trial of an adult 
person, when approved by the court, shall be paid from the treasury of the 
county in which the hearing or trial is held. 
Upon request of the court, the sheriff of the county in which a hearing 
is held shall aid the court in maintaining order during the hearing, and 
upon request of the court, shall transport a child to the state industrial 
school or other institution. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 53. 
55-10-116. Court records-Inspection-Fingerprinting child prohibited, 
exception.-The court and the probation department shall keep such records 
as may be required by the board and the presiding judge. Court records 
shall be open to inspection by the parents or guardian, other parties in the 
case, the attorneys, and agencies to which custody of a child has been trans-
ferred; and with the consent of the judge, court records may be inspected 
by the child, by persons having a legitimate interest in the proceedings, and 
by persons conducting pertinent research studies. Probation officers' records 
and reports of social and clinical studies shall not be open to inspection, 
except by consent of the court given pursuant to rules adopted by the 
board. 
Without the consent of the judge, no fingerprints shall be taken of any 
child taken into custody, unless the case is transferred for criminal pro-
ceedings. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 54. 
55-10-117. Expungement of juvenile court record-Petition-Procedure. 
-Any person who has been adjudicated in a children's case under this act, 
may after the expiration of one year from the date of termination of the 
continuing jurisdiction of the juvenile court, or, in case he was committed 
to the state .industrial school, one year from the date of his unconditional 
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release from said school, petition the court for the expungement of his 
record in the juvenile court. Upon the filing of such petition, the court 
shall set a date for a hearing and shall notify the county attorney of the 
pendency of the petition and of the date of the hearing. The county at-
torney and any other person who may have relevant information about 
the petitioner may testify at the hearing. 
If the court finds upon the hearing that the petitioner has not been con-
victed of a felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude since the 
termination of the court's jurisdiction or his unconditional release from the 
state industrial school and that no proceeding involving such felony or mis-
demeanor is pending or being instituted against him, and if the court further 
finds that the rehabilitation of the petitioner has been attained to the satis-
faction of the court, it shall order sealed all records in the petitioner's case 
in the custody of the juvenile court and any such records in the custody of 
any other agency or official. Copies of such order shall be sent to each 
agency or official named in the order. Upon the entry of such order the 
proceedings in the petitioner's case shall be deemed never to have oc-
curred and the petitioner may properly reply accordingly upon any inquiry 
in the matter. Inspection of such records may thereafter only be permitted 
by the court upon petition by the person who is the subject of such records, 
and only to persons named in such petition. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 55 .. 
55-10-118. Destruction of juvenile court records, when allowed.-Upon 
the expiration of five years from the twenty-first birthday of any person who 
was subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in a children's case, the 
court may order the destruction of the record in his case in accordance with 
rules adopted by the board; provided, however, that the petition, summons, 
findings, orders and decrees, and any other papers selected by the court, 
shall not be destroyed, but such records or papers may be preserved in the 
form of certified microfilm copies. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 56, 
55-10-119. Co-operation of political subdivisions and public or private 
agencies and organizations.-Every county, municipality, and school dis-
trict, the division of family services, the division of health, the state board 
of education, and state and local law enforcement officers, shall render all 
assistance and co-operation within their jurisdiction and power to further 
the objects of this act, and the juvenile courts are authorized to seek the 
co-operation of all agencies and organizations, public or private, whose 
object is the protection or aid of children. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 57; 1969, 
ch. 197, § 93. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1969 amendment substituted "divi-
sion of family services, the division of 
health" for "state department of public 
welfare, the state department of health." 
55-10-120. Plan for obtaining health and related services for juveniles-
Duty of administrator.-The administrator of the juvenile' court, with the 
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approval of the board, and the director of public health shall from time to 
time agree upon an appropriate plan: 
(1) For obtaining public health services for the juvenile court from 
the state and local departments of health; and 
(2) For assistance by the division of health in securing for the juvenile 
court special health and related services, including community mental 
health services, not already available from the division of health. The 
legislature shall provide an appropriation to the division of health for 
this purpose. 
mstory: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 58; 1969, 
ch. 197, § 94. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1969 amendment substituted "divi-
sion of health" for "state department of 
health" and "department of health" in 
subd. (2); and made a minor change in 
punctuation. 
55-10-121. Existing courtrooms, offices, facilities and equipment trans-
ferred to and existing contracts or agreements assumed by juvenile court, 
-Upon the effective date of this act, all courtrooms, offices and other facili-
ties, and all equipment, supplies, files, and other property utilized by the 
juvenile courts prior to such effective date in the name of the state depart-
ment of public welfare shall become the facilities or property of the juvenile 
court, state of Utah, established by this act. Any contract, lease, agreement, 
or any other instrument relating to the juvenile courts, executed in the 
name of the public welfare commission or the state department of public 
welfare, or any official, division or bureau of said department, shall be 
deemed, upon the effective date of this act, to be executed in the name of 
the juvenile court established by this act, and the juvenile court, state of 
Utah, shall succeed to all rights and obligations arising from such contracts, 
leases, agreements, or other instruments. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 59. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Section 66 of Laws 1965, ch. 165 pro-
vided: "This act shall take effect on J u!y 
1, 1965, except that sections 7 and 8 (55-
10-69 and 55-10-70] of this act shall take 
effect on May 15, 1965." 
55-10-122. Existing statutory provisions continued.-The provisions of 
this act, to the extent that they are substantially the same as existing stat-
utory provisions relating to the same subject matter, shall be construed as 
restatements and continuations thereof, and not as new enactments. 
mstory: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 60. 
55-10-123. Short title.-This act shall be known and may be cited as the 
"Juvenile Court Act of 1965." 
mstQry: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 65. 
Repealing Clause. 
section 55-10-48, and sections 55-10-50 to 
and including 55-10-62, Utah Code An-
notated 1953, are repealed." 
Section 61 of Laws 1965, ch. 165 pro-
vided: "Sections 55-10-1 and 55-10-2, Utah Saving Clause. 
Code Annotatecl 1953, see.tions 55-10-3 and Section 6~ of Laws 1965, ch. 165 pro-
55-10-3.1, Utah Cocle Annotated 1953, as vided: "The repeal of the provisions set 
amendecl by chapter 113, Laws of Utah forth in the preceding section of this act 
1957, and sections 55-10-4 to and inclncling [§ 61] shall not affect any adjudication, 
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commitment, order, decree or judgment 
made before the effective date of this act, 
nor the status, rights, or duties of any 
person under such adjudication, commit-
ment, order, decree, or judgment; and any 
cases pending in the juvenile courts on the 
effective, date of this act shall be heard 
and disposed of in accordance with the 
law in effect prior to said date; provided, 
however, that any supplementary pro-
ceedings or actions with respect to a 
child under the continuing jurisdiction of 
the juvenile court on the effective date 
of this act shall be governed by the pro-
visions of this act." 
Separability Clause. 
Section 63 of Laws 1965, ch. 165 pro-
vided: "The provisions of this act shall 
be severable; and if any of its provisions 
shall be held invalid, the validity of the 
remaining provisions shall not be affected 
thereby." 
Appropriation. 
Section 64 of Laws 1965, ch. 165 pro-
vided: "There are hereby appropriated 
such funds as shall be provided by the 
legislature for expenses of the juvenile 
court to carry out the purposes of this 
act." 
Effective Date. 
Section 66 of Laws 1965, ch. 165 pro-
vided: "This act shall take effect on July 
1, 1965, except that sections 7 and 8 [ 55-
10-69 and 55-10-70] of this act shall take 
effect on May 15, 1965." 
CHAPTER 11 
DETENTION SCHOOLS 
Section 55-11-1. Establishment-Superintendent. 
55-11-2. Curriculum-Teachers. 
55-11-3. Commitment from one county to another-Costs. 
55-11-4. Superintendent-Duties and salary. 
55-11-5. Boards of education to supply books. 
55-11-6. Building for detention school. 
55-11-7. Cities to contribute to support. 
55-11-8. Detention school fund. 
55-11-1. Establishment-Superintendent.-Upon recommendation of the 
juvenile court commission, the board of county commissioners of each 
county containing cities of the first or the second class shall, and in all 
other counties may, establish detention schools, one for boys and one for 
girls, not connected with any jail, which shall be in charge of a superin-
tendent to be appointed by the county commissioners upon recommendation 
from the juvenile court having jurisdiction in the county where such 
schools shall be established. It shall be the duty of the county commis-
sioners to approve or disapprove the recommendation within twenty days 
after the submission thereof; such recommendation shall be considered ap-
proved and the superintendent deemed appointed in case the county 
commissioners shall fail within said time to take any action thereon. The 
employees of such detention school shall be appointed in the same manner 
as the superintendent. 
History: L. 1907, ch. 144, § 1; C. L. 
1907, § 720x42; L. 1909, ch. 110, § 1; 1911, 
ch. 54, § 1; C. L. 1917, § 1853; R. S. 1933 
& C. 1943, 14-8-1. 
Cross-References. 
Industrial school, 64-6-1 et seq. 
Special places of detention for children, 
55-10-4[> et seq. 
Constitutionality. 
This section is constitutional. Salt Lake 
County v. Salt Lake City, 42 U. 548, 134 
P. 560. 
Effect on taxing power. 
'l'his section is not an interference with 
taxing power of the cities. Salt Lake 
County v. Salt Lake City, 42 U. 548, 134 
P. 560. 
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